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FBIS-EEU-93-172 *8 September 1993*

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Izetbegovic Addresses UN Security Council

LD0809094493 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0600 GMT 8 Sep 93

[Report by correspondent Ero Lazovic from New York]

[Text] Defend us or give us arms to defend ourselves. This is what President Izetbegovic said in his address to the UN Security Council last night, clearly, contrary to the already customary picture of his own political balance, which he has not brought into question throughout the war.

We have come to New York, Izetbegovic said, to resolve a dilemma together with you, since recently, a strange version, to say the least, of the Geneva package of negotiations has been imposed. According to it, all the warring factions involved in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict need to do is to put their signatures on the proposed maps for the war to be over.

Although this seems an attractive solution for peace, it implies rewarding those who perpetrated ethnic cleansing of territories. We cannot accept something like this, and we defined this as our minimum demand in Geneva. New York is a place where this should eventually be clear to everybody.

The president then asked the Security Council for a special guarantee that resolution 836 will be implemented, which, to recall, sets out full protection of safe havens and secures free passage of humanitarian aid. In order to show that this is not political sabotage, even less so opportunism, Izetbegovic clearly said in his address to the 15-member council that in practice, all this time, we have been forced to defend ourselves with our hands tied. Furthermore, even now we have not been offered much more: further attacks from the hills on towns and people, hunger and cold weather, schools in cellars and shelters: what should we choose from so many bad options?

We are not afraid of a fair battle, but we are not going to allow the extermination of our own people under such savage conditions. The Bosnian president also told the ambassadors, particularly addressing the five permanent representatives—and he also had a face-to-face talk with Jean-Bernard Merimee, French ambassador at the East River, that he does not wish to speak about two, three or five percent more territory for the so-called central Bosnian republic within the Bosnia-Herzegovina union. But, he added, it is not necessary to illustrate our demand for territory in figures. We need enough territory for all 50 percent of the present population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, safe access to the Adriatic Sea, and a safe port on the Sava River.

New York and the United States are the places where we wish to talk about world morality, not about figures. After all, we believe that if peace negotiations continue than the East River is close to being the ideal solution.

For the first time in his public international address, Izetbegovic equated the Belgrade Milosevic-Karadzic team to the Zagreb Tudjman-Boban one, expressing concern that our future efforts will also be abortive if they continue with their internal negotiations on carving up Bosnia.

Both President Izetbegovic and Minister Ganic acted here as a united team, announcing both at a meeting of the nonaligned countries and at a meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization countries that they will ask President Clinton in Washington late this afternoon to give written guarantees that Bosnia-Herzegovina's continued readiness to cooperate will be rewarded with a U.S. resolve to secure the requested distribution of territory and population within the eventual union and ports with an insfrastrucure at the sea and on the river. Does this really mean that Bosnia cannot survive as an isolated island even if it were a treasure island? Meetings in Washington this evening will either confirm or deny this.

World Court Ruling on Bosnia Expected 13 Sep

AU0809125793 Paris AFP in English 1233 GMT 8 Sep 93

[Text] The Hague, Sept 8 (AFP)—The International Court of Justice said it would rule next Monday [13 September] on suits brought by Bosnia-Herzegovina and rump Yugoslavia in which they traded accusations of genocide.

The Bosnian petition presented in the last week of August asked the 15-judge court to stop rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) from partitioning Bosnia through genocide.

The Yugoslav suit asked for a court order to make the Bosnians immediately halt genocide against the Serbian ethnic group.

Dutch legal experts said Wednesday they expected the court to confine itself to urging the two sides to respect the 1948 Geneva conventions outlawing genocide.

When Bosnia brought a first case in April, the court merely told rump Yugoslavia to take all the measures it could to prevent genocide against the Muslim population of Bosnia or any other ethnic, racial or religious group.

Juppe, Kozyrev Oppose Lifting Bosnia Arms Embargo

AU0709133993 Paris AFP in English 1323 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] Paris, Sept 7 (AFP)—French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe and his Russian counterpart Andrei Kozyrev reiterated their opposition Tuesday [7 September] to lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia's Muslims during a telephone conversation, authorities here said.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Richard Duque said the two officials agreed that despite the recent collapse of Geneva talks on the Bosnian crisis, lifting the arms embargo—as the Bosnians have asked—would be a risky proposition and the "priority should go to finding a peaceful solution."

The Geneva talks collapsed after Bosnia's Muslims rejected a proposed plan to carve the former Yugoslav republic into three ethnically-based states.

Duque said Juppe and Kozyrev pledged to work together to encourage Bosnia's three warring factions—Muslims, Serbs and Croats—to resume peace negotiations.

ITAR-TASS Reports Opposition

LD0709145793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1354 GMT 7 Sep 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Krasnoshchekov]

[Text] Paris, 7 Sep—The Foreign Ministers of Russia and France, Andrey Kozyrev and Alain Juppe, during a telephone conversation on Monday opposed the lifting of the arms embargo to Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is urged by the Muslim side. This was announced here today by Richard Duque, the official spokesman of the French Foreign Ministry.

Despite the break in the Geneva talks between the leaders of the three combatant sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the heads of the foreign policy departments of Russia and France came to the united opinion that in present conditions the lifting of the embargo on weapons deliveries was fraught with the danger of further aggravation of the situation in the conflict zone, Duque pointed out. The two countries' ministers stressed that the priority task was to continue the search for ways of peacefully settling all the disputed issues at the negotiating table.

In this connection, Kozyrev and Juppe expressed concern at the halting of the Geneva talks on a Bosnian settlement and agreed to "step up efforts to persuade all conflicting sides to return to the negotiating table as soon as possible in order to come to a concerted decision suiting all sides," Duque announced.

UNHCR Chief Urges Aid Work be Respected in Bosnia

AU0709122393 Paris AFP in English 1211 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] Geneva, Sept 7 (AFP)—UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata is sending letters to the beligerents in Bosnia-Herzegovina to insist on unconditional respect for humanitarian work, UNHCR spokesman Santiago Romero-Perez said here Tuesday [7 September].

With winter approaching, she was writing to Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, the political leader of Bosnian Serbs Radovan Karadzic and his Croatian counterpart Mate Boban, the spokesman said.

He said aid convoys to central Bosnia had been suspended because of fighting. The capital Sarajevo had only two hours of water and electricity a day and was being supplied solely by air.

The UNHCR has enough funds until the end of October to distribute relief, but that depends on whether there is an increased number of refugees driven to take to the roads by fighting and ethnic cleansing, UNHCR sources said.

Currently 2.3 million people in Bosnia get UN help, 1 million more than a year ago during the first winter since the war began in April 1992.

Greek Official Objects To Albanian EDU Membership

AU0809100593 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 4 Sep 93 p 4

[Interview with Marietta Giannakou-Koutsikou, head of the Greek delegation to the EDU conference, by "Nagy" in Budapest; date not given: "The Greek-Albanian Debate From Athens' Viewpoint—This Is Not a Bilateral Conflict But a European Issue"]

[Text] At the meeting of the Executive Committee of the EDU [European Democratic Union], the Greek delegation raised objections in connection with the EDU membership of the Albanian governing party. We asked the head of the Greek delegation, Marietta Giannakou-Koutsikou, about the reasons.

[Giannakou-Koutsikou] We did not only have simply objections. EDU members should be real democratic parties. Mr. Berisha's party does not fulfill these requirements. I could mention here the issue of the Albanian minority in Greece or the opposition within the country; some members of this opposition are currently in jail. This is not only a debate between Greece and Albania; we were not the only delegation to raise objections; this is a European issue, too. Before the meeting of party leaders, a decision was made to send an investigation committee to Albania and after this committee submits a report, the EDU will decide on whether the Albanian party can become a member. We understand those members whose countries lived in a dictatorship for many years; however, we should not be hasty in accepting all the parties in the EDU because we could later get into a situation in which we might have to ask them to leave. It is obvious, therefore, that this is not purely a Greek-Albanian problem. I must also mention the fact that Greece provides ample support to Albania, both financial support and investments, and many Albanians are working in Greece. However, we cannot accept everyone because we have had negative experiences in the area of crime, for example.

[Nagy] As far as we know, Cyrus Vance is trying to mediate between Greece and Macedonia. How are these talks progressing at the moment?

[Giannakou-Koutskiou] I would like to correct you. We are not talking about Macedonia here, but about the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The current state of affairs is that Mr. Vance called upon both sides to start negotiations. We brought up the problems and we hope that the international community will understand that it is better to find the correct solution now than having to face possible problems later. At the same time, I must add that we would like to have free and democratic states in our neighborhood, and I mean here Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We only protest the use of the name Macedonia because this name actually refers to the northern part of Greece. Before the war, this country was called Vardaria, and the change is the result of Tito's policy, and we do not want to pay now for the communist ideas.

Van den Broek: EC-Slovene Talks To Start Soon

AU0809145393 Paris AFP in English 1428 GMT 8 Sep 93

[Text] Brussels, Sept 8 (AFP)—The European Community and Slovenia will start talks soon on deepening their relationship, EC Foreign Relations Commissioner Hans van den Broek said here Wednesday [8 September].

Speaking at a press conference after an official two-day visit to Slovenia, he said the negotiations could start before the year-end. A cooperation agreement between the two sides came into force on September 1.

But van den Broek said the EC supported stronger economic and political links similar to those between the community and Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Romania and Bulgaria.

SDS Proposes Early Parliamentary Elections

AU0609201693 Sofia Bulgarska Televiziya Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 6 Sep 93

["Declaration of the Union of Democratic Forces Parliamentary Group" issued on 6 September 1993, read by announcer]

[Text] The beginning of the new parliamentary season confirmed the political evaluations and forecasts of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] and of its parliamentary group.

Prime Minister Lyuben Berov publicly admitted the total failure of the government in privatization, in land restitution, in raising the economic growth, in mitigating the social hardships of the reform, and in combating crime.

With his characteristic total lack of political sense of responsibility, Lyuben Berov put the blame for his failures on the parliamentary majority that is supporting him and complained that various trade unions and financial-economic groups are trying to blackmail the government.

President Zhelev reprimanded the cabinet for manifestations of recommunization by which he admitted his act of treason in having restored the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] to power. His attempts to set up a coalition of so-called sensible center forces against the SDS, or forming a president's party, finally collapsed.

A trade union leader admitted that when the trade unions are dictating conditions, the state is finished.

A distinguished businessman admitted that the market is divided among the various financial groups and that coordination among them already exists, which shows that the government is serving their interests well.

All this put the political roulette into operation once more. The gamblers are well known, and the bluffs are also notorious.

Some people are hoping for a cabinet reshuffle, meaning new ministerial posts; others are hoping for new blows below the belt on the part of the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] and for new reversals, but to the right this time rather than to the left; others are hoping for overt communist rule; but they all hope to play their game and win at the expense of the SDS.

The SDS Parliamentary Group cannot allow itself to be involved in similar political plots and is convinced that the restoration of the people's genuine political will through early parliamentary elections is the only way to overcome the political crisis. As a result of such elections, the SDS is likely to form the parliamentary majority and take over the country's government.

Economic Situation 'Desperate' Due To Embargo

AU0609193793 Sofia BTA in English 1543 GMT 6 Sep 93

[Text] Sofia, September 6 (BTA)—"The Bulgarian public must view things not only in a geostrategic plan but must also pursue its national interests, Bulgaria's all geostrategic, economic and geographic advantages should be used to turn it into a regional power," said Mr. Nikolay Slatinski MP of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] and chairman of the National Assembly Committee on National Security, speaking at a news conference today. "As long as we have a poverty, weakness and dependence complex, Bulgaria's new foreign policy will never be born," Mr. Slatinski said. "I would like to see our conduct as a state reconsidered rather than the principle of integration with the EC," he observed.

As estimated according to international methods, Bulgaria lost over 2,500 million dollars from the embargo against Iraq and Libya alone, losses from the sanctions against Serbia were 942 million dollars in 1992 and 810 million dollars between January 1 and April 30, 1993, according to government figures, Mr. Slatinski noted. Since the entry of UN Security Council Resolution 820 into force, Bulgaria has been losing 259 million dollars monthly, he said. By September 1993, Bulgaria's losses from the Yugoembargo have totalled 2,800 million dollars, Nikolay Slatinski said.

The lack of any compensations whatsoever, the country's total isolation from international markets, the blocked shipping on the Danube, the impeded traffic across Romania, the stranding of Bulgarian farm produce, as well as various restrictions and prices arbitrarily forced up by foreign companies because of Bulgaria's lack of alternatives deteriorate the country's adversity and escalate social tensions. The national and municipal budgets are deprived of revenue, to say nothing of indirect losses and ceasing gain and of the losses sustained by the private sector. The situation is desperate indeed, Mr. Slatinski said.

If the will is there, the international community could set in motion its bureaucratic mechanisms to provide Bulgaria with compensation in some form, Mr. Slatinski believes. The gullibility of the Bulgarian public, of politicians of every stripe and of the Bulgarian parliament led to the unconditional acceptance of the sanctions without advance linkage with any commitments and possibilities for compensation, he said. Mr. Slatinski welcomed the firm line on the matter adopted by the Bulgarian government, and specifically what he called "the national egoism and aggressiveness" of the Foreign Ministry. A whole package of proposals for compensation of the Bulgarian losses has been worked out, including a lifting of Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] restrictions, Mr. Slatinski recalled.

The sanctions are not a problem of Bulgaria only: This is an acid test of the viability of the UN's principal means

of influence, which could be discredited in the eyes of other states because of the adverse effects of the embargo on the Bulgarian economy, the MP said. The sanctions would come at an exorbitant price if they result in a destabilization of Bulgaria because of its economic collapse: The country would become a hotbed of social and ethnic tensions, ceasing to be a Balkan "island of stability," Mr. Slatinski said.

Yordanov Relieved From SDS Deputy Chairman Post

AU0709180493 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] Aleksandur Yordanov is no longer deputy chairman of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] National Coordinating Council because of amendments to the statute of the coalition that were adopted at today's session. According to these amendments, SDS members are not entitled to hold political and state offices at the same time.

At the same session today it was decided that the National Coordinating Council should be authorized to disband local SDS coordinating councils that do not implement the decisions of the National Coordinating Council and that are unable to function because of internal conflicts.

Today's session of the SDS Coordinating Council approved yesterday's declaration of the SDS Parliamentary Group, which called for early parliamentary elections.

The National Coordinating Council expressly distanced itself from a statement by Nikolay Slatinski on the embargo against Yugoslavia.

It was decided to hold the SDS theoretical conference on 2 and 3 October 1993.

Working commissions were set up for this purpose, headed by Edvin Sugarev, Dimitur Nenov, Asparukh Panov, and Ivan (?Kunev).

DPS Leader Dogan 'Tired' of 'Balancing Force' Role

AU0809101393 Sofia BTA in English 1915 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] Sofia, September 7 (BTA)—Interviewed on Radio Free Europe this evening, Ahmed Dogan, leader of the ethnic Turks' Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS), said he had all reasons to expect early parliamentary elections next spring. None of the present parliamentary forces can win probable elections presently, yet if the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) does, it cannot form a cabinet, according to him. If the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) is in the dark about its own inhouse problems, it is better to put off the elections until next autumn, Mr. Dogan said.

Bulgarian politics needs a strong centre, which would guarantee a stabilization of this country, Mr. Dogan said. According to him, one DPS aim is to prevent obvious political dominance by any of the two large political forces, the BSP and the SDS. Mr. Dogan has repeatedly emphasized that the DPS has a balancing role in parliament. For a year following the parliamentary elections in October 1991, the DPS was aligned with the SDS, supporting the SDS- led government. Last autumn, however, the DPS/SDS relations got strained. The end of 1992 saw the formation of the incumbent cabinet led by non-partisan economist Lyuben Berov, formed on the DPS mandate and backed by the parliamentary BSP and the New Union For Democracy (of breakaway or expelled SDS MP's).

The DPS balancing role gave the BSP a chance to acquire a new reputation nationally and in Europe, Mr. Dogan said in his interview. But if unmistakable signs of BSP control over the government and parliament appear, the Socialists can turn things against themselves, the DPS leader said.

He also said the DPS was tired of its balancing role and cited the Agrarian Party as a most probable successor in this respect.

BSP 'Disapproves' of Government Position on Embargo

AU0809111793 Sofia BTA in English 2026 GMT 7 Sep 93

["Today"—BTA headline]

[Excerpts] Sofia, September 7 (BTA)—President Zhelyu Zhelev today awarded the order of the Madara Horseman, Second Class, to Mr. Abdelmajid Awar [spelling as received], ambassador of Algeria, for his contribution to the development of bilateral relations. [passage omitted]

Deputy Prime Minister and Trade Minister Valentin Karabashev today met representatives of Daewoo Corporation of Korea led by chairman Kim Woo-choong [spelling as received] and Kye-yong Choi [spelling as received], executive director for Europe, the government Press Office said. The guests told Mr. Karabashev about their plans to expand their market in Bulgaria. Now Daewoo is selling cars in this country through the Sinit Company. Daewoo shows interest in investment and the privatization of tourist facilities, the production of telecommunications equipment and cement production. Mr. Karabashev familiarized the guests with the economic reform in this country and privatization in particular. He was pleased with their plans to invest in privatization and stressed the Bulgarian Government would give them support.

Agriculture Minister Georgi Tanev, who is co-chairman of the Bulgarian-Danish Commission for Economic, Industrial, Scientific and Technological Cooperation, today received Mr. Klaus Otto Kappel, ambassador of

Denmark. The sides said they were pleased with the bilateral cooperation agreement, which was approved by the Council of Ministers. Mr. Kappel invited Bulgarian companies to the traditional agricultural exposition Agromek in Denmark in 1994 and to a symposium on the best use of farming equipment and facilities next autumn. Mr. Tanev offered to help Mr. Kappel visit modern pig- breeding farms using Danish equipment. According to Mr. Tanev, when privatized, those farms could become highly effective Danish- Bulgarian joint enterprises.

The Commission for Electricity State Regulation today proposed that electricity prices be raised as of the second quarter of 1994, the Power Engineering Committee told BTA today. The price rise will be fixed so as to put an end to the losses sustained by the National Electricity Company. The beginning of the second quarter is seen as the most convenient time for a price rise unless an unexpected increase in outlays creates difficulties in power generation. The Commission for Electricity State Regulation considers the National Electricity Company a loss-maker. Electricity prices will be normalized gradually.

The land reform has lagged behind for a complex of reasons but it has not failed, said Dimitur Dimkov, chief of the Land Reform Department of the Agriculture Ministry, at a briefing today. He said 18 percent of the land has been returned to the rightful owners this year. The proportion of returned land will reach 50 to 60 percent by year's end, according to him. [passage omitted]

SDS [Union Of Democratic Forces] Chief Secretary Ivan Kurtev said the coalition is strongly against the draft address by parliament to UN Secretary General Butros Ghali, submitted to the Parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee. According to Mr. Kurtev, it is the government, not parliament, that should draw up a programme to seek compensations for losses due to the embargo.

The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) disapproves of the cabinet's vague position on the Yugoembargo, it was said at a news conference today. According to them, the cabinet should take a clear stand the soonest possible and take more specific measures about the losses sustained by Bulgaria. BSP leader Zhan Videnov said a declaration on the Yugoembargo will be debated by the Foreign Policy Committee on Thursday [9 September]. He criticized the position of Prime Minister Berov and President Zhelev in favour of breaking off all contacts with Serbia. "There are ways for Bulgaria to solve the problem without withdrawing from UN Security Council Resolution 820 but this country should seek maximum benefits at the same time," Mr. Videnov said.

The leadership of the extraparliamentary Green Party today said Bulgaria should insist that the UN Security Council be convened so that this country could raise the issue of lifting the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro. According to the Greens' Deputy Chairman Lyubomir Ivanov, Bulgaria should insist on a transport corridor through Romania while the embargo is in force.

Anastasiya Mozer, leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party, believes the bipolar pattern (opposition between the SDS and the BSP) has long become obsolete. At a news conference today Mrs. Mozer said the Agrarian Party would run on its own if elections were held according to proportional representation. Despite all attacks and attempts to disparage the party's role, its electorate is strong and large enough to secure a place in political life. It is high time Agriculture Minister Georgi Tanev resigned, according to the Agrarians. They believe Mr. Tanev is not helping the land reform, on the contrary, he is impeding it. They described the reform's progress as far too unsatisfactory. The land reform, privatization and restitution are lagging behind, the Agrarians said.

The cabinet should speed the distribution of nationalized property of the former official Trade Union among the trade unions, the National Council for Tripartite Cooperation decided today. Deputy Prime Minister Evgeni Matinchev told the press the agreement for division of trade union property in six regions, signed by the cabinet and the trade unions, could be submitted for approval to the Council of Ministers before September 15. The property will be divided as follows: 55 percent for the confederation of independent trade unions, 35 percent for the Podkrepa Labour Confederation, and 10 percent for the state. Mr. Matinchev said the property should be used for trade union needs and not for business transactions. According to Mr. Matinchev, the state quota may be increased if necessary. It will be used by job centres, social workers, and the other trade unions in this country. [passage omitted]

Interior Minister Dismisses Security Chief Antonov

AU0809104293 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1900 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] Colonel Arlin Antonov, director of the National Security Service, shall be dismissed for having permitted several breaches of law in the service, which, to a great extent, are the results of his incompetent leadership.

This was declared by Viktor Mikhaylov, minister of internal affairs, in an interview with Channel One of the Bulgarian National Television.

Mr. Mikhaylov pointed that no one has exerted any pressure on him in connection with Colonel Arlin Antonov.

I have no reason to resign, Mr. Mikhaylov pointed out in connection with certain rumors spread by the mass media on the subject.

Berov Submits Neev Dismisssal to Parliament

AU0809104093 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1900 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] After the government voted a few days ago in favor of relieving Mr. Neycho Neev of his post as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, this afternoon Prime Minister Lyuben Berov submitted a draft resolution on this personel change in the cabinet to the administrative section of the National Assembly.

The draft resolution points out that it is not necessary to appoint another official in Mr. Neev's place.

Zhelev Views Land Reform, Early Elections

AU0409201093 Sofia Bulgarska Televiziya Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 4 Sep 93

[From "Panorama" political review program: Interview with Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev by unidentified Panorama representative; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Panorama] Mr. President, we are now at the beginning of the autumn political season. Would you like to outline the road that our country has traveled along in the last four years, so that we can see where we are now?

[Zhelev] Yes, this is an interesting question, one that I have also discussed with foreign journalists. I would nominally divide this four-year period into three phases, three stages. This is of course a conventional division, because parts of the phases overlap one another.

The first phase, in my view, covered the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990, when the formations, structures, and elements of a civic society were formed in Bulgaria. I am referring, first and foremost, to the appearance of the multiparty system, the independent trade unions, a free press, autonomy of the universities, the first multiparty democratic elections with foreign observers, and the first Bulgarian Parliament with an opposition. This period in fact concluded with the formation of the elements of a civic society in Bulgaria.

Alongside this, the new parliament marked the start of the second stage. I will nominally call this the institutional period, when the new democratic institutions of the Bulgarian state were set up. The first and most important of these, as I have already said, is the parliament, followed by the government, which is elected by parliament, then the presidential institution, which was elected initially by parliament itself, and subsequently, under the new constitution, directly by the people, plus the Constitutional Court, which was created in Bulgaria. However, this institutional stage, this story of our democracy, was left incomplete and was not brought to a conclusion. Under the transitional provisions of the constitution, within one year of the date of adoption of the constitution we should have set up a Supreme Court of Cassation, a Supreme Administrative Court, courts of appeal, and a government accounting office. These institutions were essential for the completion of this stage of our society's development.

However, before we were able to complete this, we were compelled very quickly and over-hastily to enter the third stage—the transition from a centralized state economy to a free market economy. Everyone knows that the main levers in this respect are the property restitution, which is almost completed or at least has advanced a very long way; privatization, on which the first steps are being made toward a breakthrough with the mass privatization project proposed by the Berov government; and the return of the land, in connection with which especially hard battles are being fought at the moment at the political level.

[Panorama] You are one of the combatants in these disputes. Would you like to tell us something about your stance?

[Zhelev] Regarding the land question, my position has always remained one and the same, namely that the land should be returned within real boundaries, in cases where the old real boundaries still exist, or within new real boundaries, with the merging of land holdings in one location, so as to permit a modern agriculture on the plains. My position regarding the Land Act has always been in line with the philosophy of the act itself—real boundaries, because the reform is impossible in practice without this. In this context, I have declared my personal opposition to the farm cooperatives that are being set up without land titles, before the land has been returned to its former owners, and I will use this present opportunity to declare to our viewers that a cooperative without land titles, without real land property returned de facto and de jure, is in fact the same as a labor cooperative farm, nothing more nor less. For this reason, I strongly insist that the land should be returned in real terms—this is the most important thing. All the disputes that are going on concerning the liquidation councils and certain secondary problems of the land reform in my view miss the main issue, which is the return of the land to its former owners. I believe that this is of exceptional importance, because this is what will allow the people who receive their land back to form true cooperatives, private cooperatives, cooperatives of owners, authentic cooperatives. Along with this, of course, those who want to acquire land in other ways will also have this opportunity. The way should be made clear for them, for leasing and selling land; Bulgaria should have a land market. A person might want to sell his land to start some other kind of business in the town or to solve other social or family problems, and so on.

[Panorama] Let us turn to the subject of our program today. What are your personal expectations of parliament and the government during the autumn political season?

[Zhelev] I expect parliament to deal immediately with the laws that have been delayed for a long time and

cannot be delayed any longer. I refer, first and foremost, to the police bill and the other statutory laws; the draft law on the reform of the entire judiciary, which I mentioned at the beginning of this interview; the other statutory laws on defense and the Armed Forces; and the bill on a consultative council for national security. These are important bills that should not be postponed.

Of course, these should go hand in hand with important economic laws, without which, of course, our market economy cannot develop.

As far as the government is concerned, I think the most important thing is that it should categorically define its priorities and concentrate all its efforts on them for the rest of the year. I have in mind the real return of the land. In this respect, the government, which represents the executive power, must implement the Land Act, it should not submit to pressure from any direction. I also think that in the field of privatization it should make the first serious, major breakthroughs. In the final analysis, this government came to power brandishing the visiting card of privatization.

[Panorama] In your view, is it possible that early parliamentary elections will be held this autumn or later?

[Zhelev] I think that early parliamentary elections will take place in any event. How soon they take place depends on the work of parliament and the government, on the efficiency of their work. However, before the actual elections are called, the Constitution prescribes a further turn of the roulette wheel, another round of mandates, so that if it turns out that this government cannot stay in power, this does not mean that we will immediately proceed to hold elections. There also exists another, very elegant alternative—indeed it is largely a hypothetical one, and it depends totally on parliament's efforts. This is the restoration of the old majority in parliament or, more precisely, the new-old majority—I am thinking of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], DPS [Rights and Freedoms Movement], and the NSD [New Alliance for Democracy], which might indeed reestablish their majority by forming a parliamentary alliance of democratic forces. All ethical, political, and juridical conditions exist for this; after all, the SDS and DPS did win the last elections.

[Panorama] Is this a realistic possibility, Mr. President?

[Zhelev] That is why I said that it exists merely as a hypothesis. I do not see any obstacles to this apart from one requirement, which is however a very strong one. This is that the key figures in these formations, on whom the creation of a new parliamentary alliance depends, must show that they are not at the level of run-of-the-mill politicians, party politickers who stick solely to narrow party or group interests, but at the level of statesmen-politicians who will defend the position of the national interest. I know that this is very difficult, because it is not so easy to forget all the insults, slanders, abuse, and scurrilous epithets. I think that for this to be achieved, politicians of state stature must found to form a majority.

[Panorama] There will be an opportunity to ask you whether (?this is being achieved). Thank you.

[Zhelev] I thank you.

Greek Foreign Minister Views Macedonia Issue

AU0809113193 Sofia BTA in English 0851 GMT 8 Sep 93

[Text] Sofia, September 8 (BTA)—"We have the best possible relations with Bulgaria and understand each other on all political issues," Greek Foreign Minister Mikhail Papakonstandinou today says, interviewed by STANDART NEWS. "Sofia was rash to recognize the so-called Macedonia and we protested. We hope your politicians will refrain from closer diplomatic relations with Skopje and none of the sides will take the initiative before the outcome of the negotiations on September 28 in New York is clear," Papakonstandinou says.

Asked if the Macedonia issue can pose an obstacle to Bulgarian-Greek relations in the future, the Greek foreign minister says, "Bulgaria's recognition of Macedonia annoyed us, but as loyal neighbours we have maintained good relations with Sofia. I believe, we'll overcome our differences at the end of the negotiations and for this reason Greece should await their completion."

Mr. Papakonstandinou says the sides will open a new border checkpoint as soon as possible, putting the delay down to technical reasons.

The Greek foreign minister says Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev is scheduled to visit Greece and Mr. Papakonstandinou himself looks forward to meeting Bulgarian Foreign Minister Stanislav Daskalov in the course of that visit.

Asked to comment on allegations of aligning by Balkan states, he says he did not think there were groups in the Balkans.

VMRO Member Views Macedonian Issue, Serbian Policy

AU0309205293 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 31 Aug 93 pp 1,4

[Interview with Valentin Kitanov, member of VMRO, the Inner-Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Societies, by Neli Khristova; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] *"Valentin Kitanov was born in Blagoevgrad 35 years ago, he is married and the father of two children. He is a historian, senior assistant at the Southwestern University in Blagoevgrad, and dean of the History Faculty. He has been a member of the VMRO since the reorganization was restored. He is one of the founders and first*

chairman of the Vardar Macedonian Organization, which was the first informal organization established following 10 November 1989."

[Khristova] The VMRO is a patriotic organization, but until recently it was dangerous to call oneself a patriot, because it involved the risk of being accused of nationalism. Have you been exposed to such attacks?

[Kitanov] In my view, such a separation and confrontation of terms is ridiculous, because they actually mean one and the same thing. If a Bulgarian is not a nationalist, what is he? By the term nationalist I understand a Bulgarian who is inspired by the desire to belong to the Bulgarian nation, is proud to be a Bulgarian and to live as a Bulgarian. One of the first tasks in restoring the VMRO was to restore the meaning of certain concepts that were distorted in the past. Macedonian, Macedonians, Pirin Macedonia—these words were taboos, subject to the arbitrary interpretation of Skopje, and they naturally assumed a non-Bulgarian meaning. It is high time to declare that to be a Macedonian means nothing but to be a Bulgarian from Macedonia!

[Khristova] The VMRO-SMD and the "Ilinden" Alliance of Macedonian Organizations have diametrically opposed objectives and tasks, but do they have something in common, nevertheless? Perhaps regarding their structures and methods of action?

[Kitanov] Would you say that the elephant and the ant have something in common? Moreover, "Ilinden" is an illegal organization, while VMRO operates with legal methods only. Among VMRO's main characteristic features are professionalism, intelligence, and the competence of its leaders. The same applies to the past, hundred years ago, when the organization was created by distinguished representatives of the Bulgarian intelligentsia.

[Khristova] What is your attitude to the members of the "Ilinden" Organization?

[Kitanov] In a democratic state, everyone has the right to determine his own national identity, but this cannot be totally arbitrary. It is simply illogical for an individual born from a Bulgarian mother and a Bulgarian father to call himself something else. Those who call themselves Macedonians today are investing this purely Bulgarian term with an anti-Bulgarian meaning. [passage omitted]

[Khristova] How long is your organization supposed to exist? What is your final objective?

[Kitanov] Our basic objective is the solution of the national problem. However, if this solution should not conform with Bulgarian interests, there will be some more work for us. Ours is a flexible organization that, in compliance with the changes of historical development, is ready to transform its essence and image. There will always be need for an organization to defend Bulgaria's national pride.

I presume that the Macedonian question is likely to become one of the most important international issue in the near future and the fact that Bulgaria is not prepared will once more, as in the past, confront our country with the accomplished facts. I urge Bulgarian diplomacy not to abstain from frequent contacts with the VMRO, which could be only useful. A large amount of data, operational technologies in Macedonia, channels for collecting information, and means of exerting influence are available to us.

Bulgaria should categorically declare its readiness to assume responsibility for the future of Macedonia and should, as soon as possible, take its place among the countries that determine the solution of the Macedonian question in its contemporary aspect. I mean the independence of Macedonia and the right of the Bulgarian population in Vardar and Aegean Macedonia to self-identification.

[Khristova] The view has been expressed that the opening of the borders and free communications among people from the three regions of Macedonia are likely to provide a natural solution for the Macedonian question. Do you agree?

[Kitanov] The opening of the borders is an inevitable process. The Bulgarian citizen must know what happens in Macedonia. Cultural propaganda is both a right and an obligation for us. It is an intolerable situation that, in a city that was, once upon a time, the Bulgarian capital, not even one Bulgarian newspaper is sold, while newspaper stalls are bursting with Serbian and Greek publications. We are also ready to accept Macedonian literature. I think that an interest in the past of Macedonia is growing in our country, while the spiritual and ethnic links among the people of Vardar and those who live between Pirin and the Black Sea are becoming tangible. The question of Macedonianism must be resolved soon, and it should be settled in Sofia and Skopje, rather than in Belgrade and Washington. We do not need any mediators.

[Khristova] Do you think that this is possible, and what is your commentary on the recent statements of Serbian politicians related to the independence of Macedonia?

[Kitanov] The Serbian policy on the Macedonian issue is very consistent. Regardless of who is in power and who is in opposition, Macedonia is considered a conquered territory that should remain so for ever.

[Khristova] What is your message for our readers?

[Kitanov] The time has come for us to realize that, at the end of the 20th Century, fate has destined the citizens of Bulgaria and of the Republic of Macedonia to overcome the controversies of the past and to understand that, from a historical and spiritual point of view, Bulgaria without Macedonia is like a tree without roots, while Macedonia without Bulgaria is like a deer among wolves.

Assembly Ratifies Debt Rescheduling Agreements

AU0709204893 Sofia BTA in English 1744 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] Sofia, September 7 (BTA)—Parliament today ratified bilateral agreements on the rescheduling of Bulgaria's Foreign Debt to official creditors in accordance with the coordinated protocol on Bulgarian debt consolidation, signed in Paris last December 14.

Parliament ratified the following documents: an agreement between the Bulgarian Government and Austria's Kontrollbank based in Vienna, representing Austria, and a credit agreement between the Bulgarian Government and Creditanstalt-Bankverein of Vienna, representing Austria, signed in Sofia on April 16; an agreement between the Governments of Bulgaria and Switzerland, signed in Sofia on April 30; an agreement between the Governments of Bulgaria and Sweden, signed in Sofia on May 18; an agreement between the Governments of Bulgaria and the Federal Republic of Germany signed in Bonn on April 23; and an agreement between the Bulgarian Government and the Finnish Council for Guarantees for certain commercial credits, signed in Sofia on April 13.

Parliament gave its consent to the government to negotiate with the European Investment Bank and sign an agreement for an ECU [European Currency Units] 60 million loan which will be used for air traffic control development.

Commentary Criticizes U.S. Ambassador's 'Frankness'

AU0809093593 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 6 Sep 93 p 6

[Unattributed commentary: "Mr. Hill Was Frank"]

[Text] On Saturday [4 September] we said goodbye to U.S. Ambassador Hugh Kenneth Hill on the "Panorama" television program. It would be very educational for the National Assembly members, the government, and the president to see again the videorecording of the program.

We were told that we, Bulgarians, are "on the road." This is good. We could be "on the street" [forsaken]. It is not a big deal. The foreigners have difficulties in understanding the Bulgarian language's idioms. The trouble is in something else, namely, in Mr. Hill's extreme frankness. For example, this was obvious when the U.S. diplomat was asked why the United States does not utilize its international authority in helping Bulgaria out of the situation in finds itself in as a result of the Yugoslav embargo. The diplomat did not say a single word about the U.S. authority or about utilizing it. Instead, he passed the ball to the United Nations. He even did not try to bamboozle us in anything related to the barges on the Danube.

He was even more frank in anything related to what the Americans think about our security. Mr. Hill simply explained that the United States never gave us any guarantees of our security. When a diplomat does this, and let us remember that it is his professional duty to sweeten even the most bitter truths with empty talk, we can understand that the United States does not give a damn about our security. After all, even its ambassador told us so in not too many words.

Then why did we show such servility to our new big brother? So that he could treat us as a punching bag, more or less like the Serbs? They at least showed some character, while we whine about our legal rights. No one respects those who whimper.

Therefore, at parting, Mr. Hill delicately and diplomatically showed us the middle finger. However, this did not impress Garelov [the host of the Panorama television program]. It seems that four years ago he became familiar with this U.S. finger at the Bulgarian-Turkish border.

Havel Criticizes Lack of Support For Rushdie

LD0709173093 Prague CTK in English 1458 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] Prague, Sept 7 (CTK)—President Vaclav Havel today criticised the idea of politically distancing oneself from the situation of British author Salman Rushdie, who paid a surprise visit to the Czech Republic last week.

Presidential spokesman Ladislav Spacek also reiterated his challenge to Monday's [6 September] claim by Premier Vaclav Klaus that the government had not been informed in advance of Rushdie's visit.

However, asked whether Havel's criticism was directed specifically against Klaus's statements, Spacek said, no comment.

Rushdie was in the Czech Republic Sept. 2-5 to participate in a seminar on nationalism and racism held in Liblice, near Prague, and sponsored by the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly. On Thursday evening he also met privately with President Havel.

Through a spokesman, Klaus said yesterday that Havel's meeting with Rushdie was a private affair of the president and that it should not be interpreted as an act directed against Islamic countries.

But at the European Cultural Colloquium in Prague today, Havel said that support for Rushdie was support for the values of law and justice, values which formed the basis of European tradition and integration: it strikes me as strange when someone who believes in these values, who wants to participate in this integration, simultaneously finds various, more slick or tactical reasons not to have anything to do with Rushdie.

The author has been in hiding since February 1989, when Iran's Ayatollah Khomeyni pronounced a death sentence on him for blasphemy against Islam in his novel The Satanic Verses.

Spacek said on Czech television last night that Havel had personally informed Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec in advance of Rushdie's arrival. The government therefore must have known, he said today, because it approved the necessary security measures for the author's visit.

Klaus Dismisses Criticism

LD0709223593 Prague CTK in English 2019 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] Prague, Sept 7 (CTK)—Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus today dismissed earlier statements by President Vaclav Havel concerning British author Salman Rushdie as philosophical musings having absolutely nothing in common with political considerations.

Havel said at the European Cultural Colloquium today that support for Rushdie, who has been in hiding for 4 ½ years, represented support for the values of law and justice. It is considered very likely, although presidential spokesman Ladislav Spacek would not confirm it, that Havel was directing his remarks at Klaus, who attempted Monday to distance himself from Rushdie's surprise visit to the Czech Republic last week.

Klaus said he viewed Havel's statements as philosophical musings which I could respond to in a philosophical treatise. Political considerations are something else entirely.

This does not mean, he added, that I do not share the same values. It is a cheap shot to pretend that the values of justice and morality are at issue here. That is simply not true at all. In no case has there ever been, nor is there, any dispute about this. You may have noticed that I consider it extremely unfair to be directing a debate about justice and law against something I said. I have never spoken about justice and law.

To reproach me for something about morality and law is a total, complete mistake, and I reject it completely, he added.

Klaus claimed he had not been informed in advance of the visit and that he considered Havel's meeting with Rushdie to be the president's private affair. He also said he hoped that Islamic countries would not interpret the visit as directed against them.

The premier also said on the Czech radio programme Radiozurnal tonight that he did not believe his difference of opinion with Havel over the Rushdie visit reflected a lack of coordination in the country's foreign policy.

The Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, which had invited Rushdie to its seminar on nationalism and racism, expressed today its disquiet over Klaus' Monday statements. A statement from the assembly said it hoped the author's visit to Prague would pave the way for the Czech Republic to join the United States, Britain, France, Germany and other countries which have condemned the death sentence against Rushdie as a terrorist act. A letter identical in content to the statement was sent to Klaus.

Klaus Interviewed on EDU, Budget, Rushdie

LD0709193593 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1615 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Regular Tuesday interview with Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus by Katerina Kasparova and Vaclav Musilek—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Musilek] Premier, one of the results of the conference of the European Democratic Union in Budapest, which you attended last week, was the requirement to set up a universal security system in Europe. One can hardly object to this idea, but had the representatives of the member parties of the union any specific

idea on what its basis should be, whether on some of the current initiatives, or will they try to initiate new ones?

[Klaus] I must say that, for the time being, there certainly is not any unity. There certainly exist two opposing camps. One says that the current institution is sufficient, the other says that new institutions must be set up. The third, where I could be included, thinks that if there is a problem it does not mean that it must be institutionalized. It is a false socialist vision that if there is a problem, an institution must be set up to solve it. I think this is a somewhat distorted vision of the world and everybody talks about a security vacuum.

I simply do not agree that there is a vacuum. Simply, the fact that there is no organization that would solve something does not mean that there is a vacuum. This is alleged only by those who do not trust the market in the general political sense of the word, those who want to instutionalize everything. I am simply against it.

[Musilek] Let us mention the topic of the state budget. The 3 billion surplus at the end of August is very promising for the next few months. But one can expect that the pressure on the expenditure side will strengthen toward the end of the year and that, along with this pressure, the danger of a state budget deficit in the final balance of this year will grow.

[Klaus] I would not like to overestimate the word "promising." I should like to remind everyone of what 3 billion means. For a rank and file citizen, this is a horrendously large sum, nobody can even imagine what it means, what one can buy for it. For us, 1 million is mostly an unimaginable sum. One billion is something completely different. That is one thing. Another thing is that for the state budget, the 3 billion is less than 1 percent of the state budget expenditure and 1 percent, as we all know from our own experience—1 percent of our month's expenses, year's expenses—can very easily tip one way or the other, so that the 3 billion are no victory and no security.

It is always the case that toward the end of the year one spends in a little more worry-free way and this will, no doubt, also apply in the Czech Republic in 1993. We simply cannot avoid this general law. So the 3 billion are just about sufficient for our budget for next year to be balanced, so that we are not repaying some useless state debt which is a burden. Simply, in that case, every citizen then pays off this debt from his or her own taxes, every citizen pays a considerably large interest which exists on this debt.

[Musilek] Does this mean that you will monitor very carefully the expenditure side of the budget toward the end of the year to prevent a repetition of year 1991, when the budget of the Czech Republic, although it had also looked good during the year, ended in a deficit after all.

[Klaus] Of course. Simply, this is a task of the minister of finance. I will certainly not be the one who will verify each day how the balance of income and expenditure of the budget stands, but it is our intention.

[Kasparova] It seems that in the shadow of other events, the issue of the senate, considered by the Czech constitution as the second chamber of the parliament, has been somewhat forgotten. The opposition, and, in part, also the coalition section of the political spectrum reckon that the senate will not materialize, or in other words, that it will be abolished. After all, the fact that you are not a very hot fan of the senate is well known. When will this issue be resolved? [passage omitted]

[Klaus] I have always been speaking about the senate in a skeptical way. I will say nothing new when I say that I think that the second chamber of the parliament is not an essential institution for our country. My pragmatic thinking tells me that seeking some kind of function for it would be in vain.

Dreaming up an institution and then looking for a function for it would be wrong, it would be wrong under any circumstances. A similar threat is looming with regard to our territorial set-up.

The first eight months—and today is already the ninth month of the building of the Czech Republic—have not yet indicated one single instance where we might have noticed the absence of the senate. [passage omitted]

I have never heard the media saying: Now at this precise moment we are lacking the senate, if it were here, this particular development would not have taken place. I have never heard anything like it, and that's very symptomatic. It is not just an accident, it precisely shows that this institution is in fact unnecessary.

[Kasparova] In this regular interview for Czech radio, we recently discussed media speculations about coalition meetings dedicated to foreign policy. You are always maintaining that meetings of this kind make sense only if a specific topic is discussed. Could the coordination of the ways in which we implement our foreign policy doctrine be one of these topics, for example? For instance, the president's meeting with the British author Rushdie this Sunday and your subsequent, in effect negative response, provides a clear example of the need to coordinate some actions of constitutional officials. There are more examples of this kind.

[Klaus] I am not sure that this is an issue of a lack of coordination. My view of Mr. Rushdie and of the external political circumstances surrounding his visit is probably different from that of the president of our republic. I do not think that these differing views can be tackled by improving foreign policy coordination, because I think that each person is placing different emphasis on different issues. I do not believe that the problem lies in the lack of coordination.

The day before Mr. Rushdie's visit to our country, I had an hour-long conversation with the president of the

republic, and the fact that we did not exchange information about this visit, or that I was not told about it, does not mean that we are lacking coordination. Coordination is a marginal issue. And so, as you well know, my opinion of these matters is not too positive. We are holding nonstop discussions about foreign policy. [passage omitted]

There are, say, five people in this country who are involved in foreign policy making. They are: the foreign minister, the president of the republic, the prime minister, the parliament speaker, and the chairman of parliament's Foreign Policy Committee.

I have no objections whatsoever—and this is precisely the point I and foreign minister have been discussing—against organizing regular meetings of these five persons plus two deputy foreign ministers, where we could coordinate things from time to time. But in my view, even this does not represent coalition talks on foreign policy. And so, as far as this issue is concerned, I am, indeed, skeptical. [passage omitted]

Benda on Army Post; Klaus Discusses Assets

AU0609161993 Prague CTK in English 0829 GMT 3 Sep 93

[Excerpt] Prague, September 3 (CTK)—[Passage omitted] No one has canceled my candidature for general inspector of the Army, says Christian Democratic Party (KDS) chairman Vaclav Benda in an interview in the leftist RUDE PRAVO today, adding that either an amendment or acceptance of the bill concerning this position has simply been postponed for so long. A definite answer to whether the post will go to him depends, he says, on the bill's final form.

Benda expresses concerns over proposed changes to the authority of the position. Combining two current concepts would mean that instead of an ombudsman, the position of a sad bureaucrat who would listen to complaints and send a yearly summary to parliament would be created.

Benda also criticizes the functioning of secret services and control of security services. He calls inexcusable the presence of agents of the former communist secret service (StB) in the current security services, and the more significant positions they are attaining.

Around 65 former StB employees currently work in the Czech BIS Security and Information Service. That is dangerous, he emphasizes.

Commenting on President Vaclav Havel's announcement yesterday regarding the desirability of publicizing high government and political figures' asset ownership, Premier Vaclav Klaus in the same paper says: I keep looking forward to the day when some journalist asks me about my assets and I will rejoice knowing that I own a 1986 Skoda 125 L, a three-room cooperative apartment, and an old cottage in Western Bohemia. That is all. [passage omitted]

Budget Surplus Registered in August

AU0809110693 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 6 Sep 93 p 1

["(fr)"-signed report: "The State Budget Is Still in the Black"]

[Text] The state budget had a surplus of 3.0 billion korunas in August. This statement was made by Finance Minister Ivan Kocarnik. According to him, this decline—compared to the 5.6 billion koruna surplus in July—was caused, first and foremost, by the change in the clearing account with Slovakia. In July, the Czech Republic had a debt of 2.4 billion korunas and, therefore, the real budget surplus was 3.2 billion korunas. On the other hand, we became creditors at the end of August. We have a positive balance of 400 million korunas and, therefore, the real budget surplus is 3.4 billion korunas. At the moment, it is impossible to find any regularity in the clearing account's balance, said the minister in reply to a question from HOSPODARSKE NOVINY. The situation will become clearer once a single account is introduced; this should take place on 1 October, he added. The state budget's total income at the end of August amounted to 232 billion korunas; expenditure amounted to 229 billion korunas. The Finance Ministry is somewhat disappointed by development in value-added tax returns, where the reduction in August was around 3.0 billion korunas. According to the minister, the amendment to the law on value-added tax, which came into effect on 1 August, had some influence here. However, the yield from value-added tax should increase again next month, added Kocarnik.

Daily: Good Reasons for RFE Relocation to Prague

AU0809114193 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 4 Sep 93 p 3

[Commentary by Jan Urban: "Cogent Argument"]

[Text] The Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty radio stations could be abolished in the near future. The Congress and the U.S. Administration are led to this decision, first and foremost, by the need to cut costs and by their somewhat traditionalist view of these "heckling broadcasters" that the communists had hated so much as anachronistic instruments of the cold war. In the post-communist countries one finds very few political topics today, on which government deputies would agree with opposition deputies or churches with trade unions. Resistance to the idea of abolishing these probably still most-highly-regarded news radio stations in our part of the world is certainly one of them. Even though Boris Yeltsin, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Vitautas Landsbergis, and Vaclav Havel have all spoken up in their defense, and

Vaclav Havel came up with the idea that the two stations could have their seat in Prague, it seemed that the endeavor to reduce the U.S. budget deficit would prevail. If the Czech Government agreed to the radio stations' relocation to Prague, it would be the first step undertaken by the Czech Republic, as the first postcommunist country, to rescue them. Taking a closer look at the matter, it should be clear that an economic solution offers itself here, from which all sides could only profit. By moving this prestigious U.S. Government institution to the territory of a former communist country, the U.S. Administration would do more to emphasize its confidence in the lasting nature of the democratization process than by issuing 100 proclamations to this effect. The reorganization and slimming down of the bureaucratic apparatus would, together with the relocation, help to cut costs significantly, especially if the Czech Government really offered the building of the former Federal Assembly as the European seat of both radio stations. The government and Prague would also gain a few hundred jobs and considerable economic advantages. If the Czech Government succeeds in quickly enlisting the support of other East European countries for this proposal, this step might be transformed into a major foreign political success.

Finance Minister Outlines Draft 1994 Budget

AU0709134293 Prague CTK in English 2031 GMT 3 Sep 93

[Text] Prague, Sept 3 (CTK)—The 1994 proposal for the Czech state budget includes decreases in income tax rates from 45 percent to 42 percent and tax write-off increases for each child from 9,000 crowns to 10,800 crowns, announced Finance Minister Ivan Kocarnik at a press conference today.

The individual tax write-off for transportation will also rise from its present 2,400 crowns to 3,600 crowns, Kocarnik added.

Overall, income taxes should moderately decline, according to the new budget. One move which should improve competition on the market is the proposal to reduce the cut-off for value added tax payments by half. Up to now, that figure has been six million crowns.

The minister claimed that the budget for 1994 has been designed to balance, an aspect with which other economic ministers agree. The proposal has been based on a previously published prognosis for 1994 which anticipated a two to three percent growth in the economy, one-digit inflation, etc.

Overall public revenues are estimated to reach 433 billion crowns, 380 billion of which would be state-generated and another 53 billion from communities. The share of public expenses in the gross national product would thereby mildly drop from 46.5 percent to 45.3 percent.

In the expenditures portion of the budget, the state's participation in housing will increase by two billion crowns to five billion. Subsidies for heat will remain the same at 11.5 billion crowns in the new budget. Unemployment benefits will drop, however, from 5.5 billion to 4.5 billion crowns (this is based on the assumption unemployment will not change and a lower average overall).

The entry labelled all other supplies to households should increase from 107 billion crowns to 122 billion in 1994. This means good news for schools and culture: The present 35.8 billion schools [receive] would grow to 42.6 billion crowns in 1994 and culture would receive 2.2 billion from the state instead of its 1.9 billion in 1993. Subsidies for non-investment business expenses will drop (from 30 to 28 billion). The state will speed up its generosity to security forces (by 13 percent) than the average increase rate of 8.5 percent.

In accordance with other economic ministries, the Czech Finance Ministry has worked long-term programs into the 1994 budget in order to spur economic growth. One of those programs is for highway construction which involves adding 40 kilometers in roads annually up to the year 2000 with a total cost of five to six billion crowns.

The government will treat the 1994 budget proposal on September 15.

[Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech on 6 September on page 2 carries a 700-word Martin Frydl report on Kocarnik's news conference, which additionally quotes the finance minister as having said that "we intend to stabilize the absolute level of state debt at its present level, 163 billion korunas. The share of the state debt in GDP should drop from the present approximately 17 percent to 10.5 percent by the year 2000."]

Communists Support ODS on Church Restitution

AU0609161893 Prague CTK in English 2109 GMT 2 Sep 93

[Text] Prague, Sept 2 (CTK)—The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) demands that a full separation of the church from the state be carried out and that expenses ensuring the participation of believers in religious life are covered from their own funds and from church property.

In a statement which was given to journalists today the KSCM rejected other church claims on restitution of its property. The statement appreciates the stand taken on the issue by the ruling Civic Democratic Party (ODS) which, it says, is more realistic and more correspondent to the view of the majority of the population than the positions of the Christian parties and the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA).

The KSCM does not oppose that wrongs inflicted on the church after February 1948 (when communist regime

was installed in Czechoslovakia) be set right, the statement says. It adds, however, that contributions of citizens including atheists to church property should be taken into consideration. The KSCM demands that restitution of church buildings be conditioned by preservation of the social and cultural institutions which are located in these buildings and serve to the benefit of all citizens. These buildings should be returned to the church only on condition that it proves its capability to manage these public institutions, the statement says.

Archbishop Bemoans Government's 'Lack of Understanding'

AU0709131993 Prague CTK in English 1448 GMT 3 Sep 93

[Text] Prague, Sept 3 (CTK)— A lack of understanding of the significance of the church could lead to the passage of unjust laws which could put her in the same situation she was in until recently and legalize past wrongs, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Prague and Czech Primate Miloslav Vlk told CTK at a press conference today.

He said that the Catholic Church had not yet been officially invited to any of the discussions currently being held by the coalition parties regarding the relationship of the church to the state.

This view of the church, which has been heard repeatedly in recent months and which places it at the same level as various other associations, is known in Europe only from the time of oppression and harassment, Vlk said. The church rejects this in principle not because it wants to lay claim to political and societal privileges, but because this pragmatic-political evaluation corresponds neither to the special calling of the church nor to her historical function and international character, he continued.

Vlk recalled the response of Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus to a letter from the Czech Evangelical Conference from October 1992. At that time Klaus wrote: We would not want ill-considered legal regulations to place the church on the level of other worldly institutions, impoverishing and restraining her.

Vlk also said that the meeting of Catholic representatives with Czech politicians, which should take place next week on the occasion of the Prague symposium of the Council of European Evangelical Conferences, did not have any preset agenda. He said, however, that it was possible that the relationship of church to state in the Czech Republic would be discussed, but stated that the scope of the symposium was more Europe-wide. The calling of the church is not to be a political power or a partner of political parties, he said.

The problem of the restitution of church property is not at the moment the most important reason the church is here, he said. The church, he noted, was without property for 40 years, and if necessary, would continue this way. He reiterated, however, that the main reason for the church's request that her property be returned was the independence and self-sufficiency of the church.

Meciar: Social Policy To Curb Romany Birth Rate

AU0709134693 Prague CTK in English 1827 GMT 3 Sep 93

[Text] Spisska Nova Ves, East Slovakia, Sept 3 (CTK)—Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar said today that it is necessary, by lowering family allowances, to achieve a reduction in extensive reproduction of socially unadaptable and mentally backward population.

Meciar made this remark here during a discussion on the gravest problems of the Spis region—unemployment, crime and the Romany (Gypsy) question—attended by representatives of the state administration and local authorities of the Spisska Nova Ves region.

It was stressed during the debate that Gypsies (called Romanies in Slovakia and the Czech Republic), who represent more than 13 percent of the Spisska Nova Ves population, are to a great extent responsible for the growing crime in the region. In addition, most are jobless.

Meciar said that reduction of the mining and engineering industries in the region had had a negative impact. He said that under an agreement with banks 250 million Sk [Slovak korunas] (about 0.9 million USD) would be earmarked to support business in the region.

Slovak Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Olga Keltosova said that under the amendments to the valid social security regulations which are currently being prepared, the amount of an unemployment benefit will depend on how a jobless person participates in publicly beneficial works.

Mayor of Spisske Podhradi Frantisek Slebodnik said that a partial calming of relations between Slovaks and Romanies in his town was noticeable in recent period. He said that the fact that payment of social allowances to Romanies was connected with their participation in publicly beneficial works had had a positive effect.

Reacting to Slebodnik's speech, Meciar said that the town should not have issued an ordinance banning Romanies from appearing in the streets at night and establishing a special regime for them in July. Meciar said that this move has harmed Slovakia's name abroad.

Slovak Interior Minister Jozef Tuchyna, who was also present at the meeting, said that according to statistics not only Romanies but other population groups contribute to the growth of crime in Spisske Podhradi.

[Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 4 September on page 2 carries a 1,000-word TA SR report on Prime Minister Meciar's visit to Spisska Nova Ves. The report renders Meciar's comments on the need to control the Romanies' birth rate as follows: "The prime minister pointed out that Romanies account for up to 25 percent of the crime rate at present. He said that one of the possibilities [of dealing with the problem] was to transfer social payments to the jurisdiction of towns and communities, which could then peg them to the participation of the unemployed in publicly beneficial work. 'It must not be more advantageous not to work!,' the prime minister stressed. He referred to the Romanies' high sickness rate and their population explosion, particularly among unadaptable groups. Minister Keltosova stressed that this, too, was one of the reasons for the intended interventions in the sphere of family allowances." Replying to a question from the TA SR correspondent, Meciar reportedly specified that "the instruments of the state's social policy can be stimulated so as not to benefit unadaptable groups of Romanies, for whom it pays to have children, by which their activity is exhausted. 'We must differentiate a certain family model,' the prime minister noted, and described a family with up to four children as the optimal model for Slovakia."]

Remarks Trigger Protests

AU0809124893 Prague CTK in English 1827 GMT 6 Sep 93

[Text] Vienna, Sep 6 (CTK)— Austrian and German Romany organizations and the Simon Wiesenthal Center spoke out sharply today against recent statements by Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar concerning Slovak Romanies, calling upon the Council of Europe to reconsider Slovakia's membership in that body.

A spokesperson for Romano Centro, the Romany association in Vienna, told the Austrian Press Agency (APA) it believed Slovakia should be expelled from the Council of Europe and that the premier's words had discredited his country.

Slovakia was accepted as a member of the Council June 30.

On Friday [3 September], Meciar said it was necessary to reduce state support to families in order to stave off the increased reproduction of socially unconformable and mentally backward residents of Slovakia.

German Romany representatives joined their Austrian counterparts in protest, the German Press Agency (DPA) reported. They said Meciar statement was a sign of sickening racism and called upon Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel to designate the Slovak premier persona non grata in Germany.

Leaders of Vienna's Simon Wiesenthal Center said Meciar's statement brought to mind Hitler's propaganda and his attempts to decrease birth rates among Jewish women. Meciar, they said, has adopted the thinking and diction of Nazism. They also called upon the Council of Europe to reconsider Slovakia's membership while Mr. Vladimir Meciar is premier.

SMENA Says Statistics on Romanies Unconstitutional

AU0709134393 Prague CTK in English 1237 GMT 4 Sep 93

[Excerpt] Bratislava, Sep 4 (CTK)—[passage omitted] Today's SMENA comments on the twelfth article of the Slovak Constitution, according to which everyone has the right to freely decide his or her own nationality. The article also forbids the exertion of any type of influence on this decision as well as all methods of pressure aiming towards denationalization. The author of the commentary points out statistics which number Romanies according to a list which former national committees worked on for many years.

The author notes that Romany nationality did not exist under the totalitarian regime. In the latest census of people, houses and apartments, he writes, only about one-third of the number of people identified by the national committees as Romany declared themselves to be so. For these reasons, he considers the compilation of such statistics to be anticonstitutional. [passage omitted]

Meciar Discusses Political, Economic Situation

AU0709113893 Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak 31 Aug 93 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Peter Kasalovsky in Bratislava on 25 August: "I Have No Doubts Regarding the Results"]

[Text] On Wednesday 25 August of this year, Slovak Republic Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar received the HOSPODARSKE NOVINY editor in chief. Their conversation lasted from 1330 to 1420. We carry a considerable portion of the recording.

[Kasalovsky] It is obvious that your cabinet has precisely the number of votes it needs in the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR] to come through even as a "minority" one. What do you, as the cabinet leader, consider the best aspects of the spring and summer of 1993?

[Meciar] Of course, political party statistics based solely on mathematics do not provide the whole picture. Nevertheless, I can confirm that the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and its government has more than 75 votes in the parliament. This represents a certain stability for the government and the possibility of an independent operation.

This year's priority has been just to keep the new state going. The fact remains that no collapse has taken place here. It was just as important a task to facilitate the entry of Slovakia into international life and international relations. We were completely successful in this respect regarding the UN, Council of Europe, CSCE, and other institutions. Slovakia needed to enter the world financial and banking relations. Today, treaties exist, among others, with the IMF, GATT, and objectively thinking people must be aware of the favorable attitude of the international forums, and that in general they create favorable conditions for the Slovak Republic.

Our government made certain of a surplus in foreign trade, and successfully negotiated the stable foreign markets and their gradual expansion. It also arranged for the establishment of Slovak currency and its stability. These are unprecedented results. I also consider it a great achievement of this government that at the beginning of October we will also be able to initial the European Agreement, which actually provides the legal framework for the association of Slovakia to the EC. In fact we also launched the complex process of the recovery of the financial flows.

I expect that only time can assess our methods, pace, and results, about which, however, we in the government have no doubts.

[Kasalovsky] What did you, as the prime minister, find most frustrating?

[Meciar] I cannot tell you anything new. Our theses have been proved correct, and our policies can be described as realistic. I do not mean that it is generally true, particularly as I am to speak about frustrations, or disillusionment from somebody—or something. Unfortunately, I believe that, following the emergence of the independent Slovak Republic, several political entities did not manage to overcome their narrow party interests. Although the inconsistency of certain political parties, the endeavors to politicize trade unions, and similar phenomena are nothing new, it troubles me that they occur here with such an intensity precisely at this time, when in pragmatic politics—disregarding party affiliation—the interest of and support for whatever propels us forward should obtain a much stronger endorsement. In Slovakia, we all need a certain harmony, and not the constant attempts at causing discord....

[Kasalovsky] According to various public opinion surveys, the citizen is faltering. There is also a constant withdrawal from the political entities. It is not an easy life, that is, the majority do not have it easy. Our society suddenly has—after less than four years since the change of the regime—a small group of very rich citizens, while, seen through "Western eyes," most of the population are very poor. Nevertheless, during the IMF executive director's visit you spoke with tremendous optimism... a growth of 4 to 6 percent is to be expected as early as 1995!

[Meciar] It is true that there is precious little left of the old society. There are very rich citizens, mostly from business and banking. There are not many people who have become rich in the production sphere. Social relations are changing, and the so far absent middle class is slowly forming. It should be more clearly defined in three or four years, when it should consist mostly of medium and small businessmen and tradesmen, management staff, private physicians in general practice, lawyers.... Of course, the category of socially dependent

citizens will remain here. The government will continue to support the emergence of the middle class also in privatization.... As you said, I spoke with great optimism, and that was precisely because the middle class is emerging, and also because of the course taken by the macroeconomic processes. We are working on the recovery of the financial management of the state, businesses, and banks. That means—clearing debts, acceleration of monetary circulation, stability of the Slovak koruna, guarantee of trade in both money and goods. It is certainly no easy, painless stage for the citizens. We are initiating structural changes that lead to a differentiation of sectors and also regions. That is also the objective of the financial strategy, the transfer from restrictions to a neutral monetary policy. Hence, the decline in GNP should end in the second half of 1994, and the so-called "bounce off bottom" limit should be reached. These are not fantastic but rather very reasonable tasks and goals, and I am convinced that a recovery—a boom in the restructured sectors—will take place.

[Kasalovsky] You can be termed an optimist. There is, however, the "human factor" and an entire scale of negative phenomena. In addition to the GNP decline, there is the growth of the crime rate.... How do you feel about the security situation in the state?

[Meciar] At the Friday (24 August) government session, we were presented with the statistics on the number of crimes per 10,000 people. The figures bear witness to our being the best off in Europe! That is also true from the point of view of solved crimes. Nevertheless, compared to last year, we have an increase in the number of crimes in excess of 30 percent. The government adopted repressive measures, even in the sphere of crime prevention.

I am going back to your comment on the human factor. It is true that changes on the macro-level are made fast and dynamically, while many companies stagnate or, in other words, hesitate, wait, and in some instances it is also speculation. That cannot be dealt with by a seminar or even the best personnel policy. Transformation programs for all enterprises must be available. How will they struggle for their survival against the new and tougher competition, adapt themselves to the market, etc?! We also adopted some measures in this regard that take into account the people, more precisely their motivation and the utilization of their abilities and skills. It would be more than naive to believe that the current state will continue. After all, just look at artificial employment, for with this no enterprise can even dream of prosperity. We must get the people in enterprises to understand that they cannot just watch but that it is up to them to create an atmosphere suitable for reasonable and able management staff. I can say for the government, however, that we will not give the opportunity to privatize to those teams that caused the ruin of the privatized enterprises. True, the sector approach must be helped—brains and brawn must be united as they are elsewhere in the world, above all in engineering, metallurgy and so on, which have been hardest hit by the crisis. A government decision cannot be the determining factor in specific conditions. That is a matter for, and also the responsibility of concrete people. In the upcoming period, it will be doubly and manifoldly confirmed that passivity destroys.

[Kasalovsky] I cannot but ask whether the government is preparing what you have indicated in public several times. Will there be scandals...?

[Meciar] Many issues are in the stage of investigation. Proving wrongdoing is a very complex matter, but that is not within the government's jurisdiction unless we are dealing with its members.

We want to contribute to the least possible number of concealed issues in the privatization process. We endeavor finding some means of supporting employee stock-holding companies and reaching a definite turnabout in the maintenance of state discipline. Unfortunately, the past years brought us also a collapse of discipline. What I have in mind is the weakened administration of state enterprises. There are sectors, which do not even pretend to be in control, and there are enterprises, in which the management acts as the owner, to say the least. There were people who tried to convince me that there must be a "Klondike" in Slovakia, i.e., panning for gold.... Those who ridicule me on the radio, for instance, would say now: "There have been gold-diggers, and they will not be here for much longer. Nevertheless, let the government go."

[Kasalovsky] The Czech side, but also Slovakia, has not forgotten your stand on the division of the property of the former CSFR, particularly as concerns the CSFR state flag, gold.... It seems like the serenity before the storm, what do you say?

[Meciar] First of all, I assess our relations with the Czech Republic as good. I am convinced that the prospects are good, too.

The division of the former federal property resulted in several forms of problems. It must be pointed out, however, that 95 percent of the division is behind us. The rest concerns practically only the gold. There is a treaty on the division of the gold, and our portion should have been on the Slovak territory before the end of March. It is not. It is true that the Czech Republic decided to hold on to our gold. That is illegal. It is not fair play. We also agreed that the Slovak Government will pay the registered value of the gold from the time of the Slovak state. The treaty has not been honored, and the idea is supported in some circles that the gold in question is really fascist gold. It has been proved that it is gold that is "untainted by the blood" of our Jewish and other fellow citizens who fell victim to fascism. This gold was acquired in business. Another problem is the budget deficit of the former federation. After all, it is impossible that all the deficits stem from Slovakia, and surpluses from the Czech Republic. There is an audit in progress but there is no deadline for the solution. The flag of the Czech Republic represents yet another problem. Certainly: We reached an agreement, even in the form of a

constitutional law that the state symbols of the former CSFR will not be used. The Czech side acted in a rather unusual manner, and we cannot observe this in silence. The flag of the former CSFR has its value, which can be expressed in either Czech or Slovak korunas, just as the holding of certain names of institutions or organizations that evoke abroad the good name of Czechoslovakia, and give rise to the idea that it is the Czech Republic that is the successor to the federation. We cannot just brush off this problem because our Czech friends defied their obligations.... The Czech National Council is fully responsible for this problem. Moreover, it is not a negligible sum. The flag issue, too, is a matter of honor and morale. Yet another problem is the issue of various compensations for the trade off of territories in Slovakia for territories in Silesia. There is no common state, so.... We can return to the territorial issue at any time.

[Kasalovsky] The problems with the restitution of Church property are very sensitive....

[Meciar] We are searching for a date that would serve as a point of departure for the act of justice. Regarding the RKC [expansion unknown], we have reached the date of the Vienna Arbitrage when fascists entered Slovakia from our southern neighbors. Also with respect to the other churches, it is necessary to explain why there was a reduction of property in 1945-1948. The wrongs began in 1945.

That property is being returned, which does not serve citizens bona fide. There are norms, laws, we have reached an agreement in principle with the churches but we are also concerned with the problems connected with the administration of the property.

[Kasalovsky] I will return, after all, to the problem of the so-called poor. There are many courageous people among them who simply could not keep up their entrepreneurial spirit all their life... and now, together with their children or grandchildren they are in rather peculiar circumstances. The equal starting point for everybody is no longer referred to as in 1989.... After all, there is also a large number of unemployed high school and university graduates of 1993—but also 1992

[Meciar] We are concerned with doing justice. That includes privatization. The question then arises of equal opportunity for all. We are trying to create conditions for entrepreneurs, including tax holidays, continued access to education for all social strata. This assumes, however, a serious approach by those in charge. There are various possibilities in the social sphere in the regions, even regarding unemployment. I would like to point out that our state assigns 83 percent of its funds to social objectives, and that is—at least in Europe—a singular phenomenon. I see the problem in our being unable to get used to, for instance, the forms of motivation, whether social, efficiency, or life motivation. It cannot be helped, the proverb "He that would eat the kernel, must crack the nut," and the young generation—since we speak of it—must learn to be with it, take care of itself, and not depend on finding someone who would assume the responsibility. There are numerous problems that directly concern the young people, and who to deal better with these than young people themselves.

Nobody claims that the current situation is precisely the enactment of justice. Nevertheless, there is nothing we can use since, as a nation, we are no longer productive. However, if the recovery that I mentioned earlier occurs, we will not be able to deal immediately with the social needs, because investments must be a priority—the structural changes in the key economic sectors—and the rest will follow later. It is simple, we want and will think of the future, so we could soon become a prosperous country with good prospects.

The prime minister's schedule is unmerciful. In just a few hours, Russian President Boris Yeltsin will arrive in Bratislava, and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar emphasizes that Slovakia and the Slovaks cannot be passive onlookers of the events in Russia, which is more than an important trading partner for Slovakia. We must actively support the progressive trends in Russia. That means maintain and develop economic cooperation on all levels. He receives information on life at the HOSPODARSKE NOVINY paper, on the preparation of the first official HOSPODARSKE NOVINY Club, and does not refuse an exclusive gold pen with the HOSPODARSKE NOVINY logo, which—as he promised—he will use to sign all documents to the benefit of our country and international treaties.

Court President Says Bilingual Road Sign Illegal

AU0609162693 Prague CTK in English 1731 GMT 2 Sep 93

[Text] Bratislava/Kosice, East Slovakia, Sept 2 (CTK)—Although he has not yet received a letter from Minister Roman Hofbauer concerning the possible introduction of bilingual road signs, President of the Slovak Supreme Court Milan Cic said today that he believed the signs should be written only in Slovak.

Recently, bilingual Slovak-Hungarian signs set up along state roads have been the subject of a dispute from the side of ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia, mainly in the country's southern regions.

I made myself acquainted with the letter's contents only in the daily REPUBLIKA, Cic told CTK, referring to Hofbauer's letter, published in the daily August 31. In his letter, Transport Minister Hofbauer requests that the court reconsider the fact of surrounding of state roads with various signs and take an unambiguous stand on it from the standpoint of the Slovak Constitution and laws.

Cic said that under the constitution it was only the government which could initiate a session of the Constitutional Court. It does not admit the possibility of a minister turning to the court. Both legal and physical persons have the right to turn to the court only if their rights were violated, Cic explained. No personal rights of

Minister Hofbauer were violated by setting up various signs along the state roads he stressed.

Setting up bilingual signs is incompatible with the law, Cic said. Under the law there should be only signs written in the Slovak language, he added.

Coexistence Calls For Minister's Dismissal

AU0709132193 Prague CTK in English 1711 GMT 3 Sep 93

[Text] Bratislava, Sept 3 (CTK)—If the dismissal of Slovak Transport Minister Roman Hofbauer was suggested in the parliament, the Egyutteles [Coexistence] movement would support it, Egyutteles Chairman Miklos Duray told CTK today.

However, he did not confirm information published recently by some papers that Hofbauer's dismissal is being initiated by the Egyutteles itself.

Duray said that he knew about the current preparation of a bill to regulate the usage of bilingual road signs set up along state roads in southern Slovak ethnically mixed regions, but as far as he knew, the bill has not yet been presented to the government Legislative Council.

He said this in reaction to the recent removal of the signs at the initiative of Slovak Transport Minister Roman Hofbauer. The action raised strong protests by ethnic Hungarians, including the Egyutteles movement.

Duray said that on August 2, Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik had promised representatives of ethnic Hungarians' parties that the bill would be completed within 2 to 3 weeks. However, we do not know if he said this only to satisfy us or if it is true, Duray added.

As early as this May, representatives of the Hungarian parties worked out a draft amendment to the language law, which is currently being discussed by parliamentary committees, Duray said. If the amendment was passed, any specific law on road signs would be unnecessary, he noted.

Hungarians Present Petition on 'Alternative Schools'

LD0709154293 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1300 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] In Bratislava a petition signed by as many as 50,000 Hungarian parents and teachers in Slovakia has been forwarded to Parliament Speaker Ivan Gasparovic. Those who signed it, requested that Slovak legislation refrain from implementing the plan of the so-called alternative schools. The education minister would like to establish schools parallel with non-Slovak language schools, where the majority of subjects are taught in Slovak, and all this at the expense of Hungarian schools.

Hungary Will Not Ask for Minority Representative

AU0709134493 Prague CTK in English 1427 GMT 3 Sep 93

[Text] Bratislava, Sep 3 (CTK)— The new Hungarian ambassador to Slovakia, Jeno Boros, said today that Hungary will not ask Slovakia to create an official representative for its Hungarian minority.

The Hungarian minority's problems should be solved by the parties and movements representing it in the Slovak parliament, Boros said at today's official handing over of his credentials to Slovak President Michal Kovac. Up till now, Boros worked in Slovakia as Hungarian charge d'affaires.

He said that the Hungarian-Slovak treaty would be signed when both states had solved their common problems.

Hungary has taken a cautious position on the solution of current problems of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and expects that the Slovak Government and parliament will resolve the problems in accordance with the relevant Council of Europe resolution, Boros said.

The Council of Europe resolution concerning Slovakia contains a recommendation aimed at securing the rights of national minorities.

Carnogursky Criticizes Government's Minority Policy

AU0609162793 Prague CTK in English 2006 GMT 2 Sep 93

[Text] Budapest, Sept 2 (CTK)— The Slovak Government cannot afford to make basic mistakes in its ethnic minority policy, chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) Jan Carnogursky said at a conference of chairmen of the European Democratic Union (EDU) member parties today.

Speaking to CTK after his meeting with Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky, Carnogursky noted that usage of Christian names and surnames in one's own language was a European standard and the Slovak Government was belated in dealing with this problem.

Not only ethnic Hungarians will appreciate reasonable steps and meeting their demands in line with the European standard. Slovakia will thus gain better starting position in international talks, Carnogursky stressed.

He said he recognized that the question of ethnic minorities was one of security as well. However, his talks with Jeszenszky did not concern such concrete issues, as it is the government which should conduct bilateral negotiations on ethnic minorities, he said.

Asked by CTK if the current Slovak Government representatives were able to understand European trends in ethnic minority policies and act in line with them,

Carnogursky answered: It is the same as to ask if communism could be reformed.

He admitted that the position of Slovak opposition parties were not fully harmonious. We (the KDH) agree with the Hungarian parties on almost everything. However, we are opposed to some of their ethnic minority claims, Carnogursky emphasized.

Slovak Organization Protests Horthy Funeral

AU0709131793 Prague CTK in English 1259 GMT 3 Sep 93

[Text] Bratislava, September 3 (CTK)— The Slovak organization Koreny [Roots] announced today that it strongly protests the approach taken by Hungary to preparations for the funeral of Miklos Horthy, and the resulting use of it for irredentistic goals and the destabilization of this part of Europe.

Koreny, made up of strongly nationalistic Slovak intelligentsia, emphasized that the planned ceremonial burial of the right-wing leader of Hungary between 1920-44 is not simply a domestic issue of Hungary, but a political act with international significance. This act legally mobilizes irredentist and chauvinistic forces, which already have led to armed conflicts in the past.

The group believes that the funeral, to take place on Saturday [4 September] in Budapest, has received an inordinate amount of publicity, and that the official Hungarian position on Horthy's character springs from unalloyed nationalistic and chauvinistic views. Horthy's active involvement in the genocide of Jews and in the repression of other nationalities in the areas occupied by Hungary, especially in Slovakia, is being covered up, states Koreny.

Horthy died in 1957 while in exile in Portugal, where he was also buried.

Majority Expect Outbreak of War Over Nationalities

AU0709131593 Prague CTK in English 1258 GMT 3 Sep 93

[Text] Bratislava, September 3 (CTK)— Most Slovaks—65 percent—fear that unrest will spread into Slovakia from Central and Eastern Europe as a result of large migrations in those areas, according to a July poll conducted by the Slovak Statistical Office.

Asked to contemplate developments up to the year 2000, 64 percent of the respondents fear the spread of terrorism and 58 percent expect the outbreak of war in Europe, sparked off by tensions over nationalities.

37 percent think the chance of nuclear war will remain as it has been up to now, while 35 percent believe the threat will increase.

Moravcik Supports 'Euro-Atlantic' Coalition

LD0709222293 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1930 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] Speaking in Vienna today [at a symposium on security in central and eastern Europe], Slovak Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik supported the proposal of Zbygniew Brzezinski to create a Euro-Atlantic coalition.

The idea is very interesting for us and needs to be developed. It is in line with the Slovak concept of achieving closer ties with NATO in the form of closer cooperation in individual spheres of defense. It is a road of natural expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance's sphere of influence in Europe, Jozef Moravcik told a TASR correspondent.

Economy Minister Interviewed on Trade Policy

LD0609200393 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 6 Sep 93

[Excerpts] In Bratislava today the government's Economic Council discussed the Slovak Republic's draft foreign trade policy. It was submitted by Economy Minister Jaroslav Kubecka who was interviewed by Jarmila Tosecka:

[Begin recording] [Tosecka] What is, or rather what will be, the orientation of Slovakia's foreign trade policy?

[Kubecka] Above all, it will be a proexport orientation because the Slovak economy, if it is to reach a certain level, simply must get into the world, it must know how to sell its products. Naturally, certain priorities must be specified, that is why we discussed which areas are the topic of our interest; the countries involved are those with advanced and market economies, countries of the Visegrad Four, some selected states, including, in the first place, the former zone of the USSR, today the Russian Federation and Ukraine. There must be strengthening of the institutional equipment. That is why we also say that, according to the turnover in the individual countries, our trade representation must be strengthened, that we want to strengthen the network of delegates which we have in some selected countries, above all those of the former eastern bloc—but you have seen how many debates have been brought about by proexport measures which we are proposing.

In the end we agreed that we will probably have to proceed in this direction and we will have to seek actual solutions which will truly help our exporters to create the conditions to realize these markets. [passage omitted]

[Tosecka] Allow me to ask one more question. Our orientation is in this sphere. Obviously, it will be understood in different ways by different sides. I assume that you will agree when I say that the orientation can be made political.

[Kubecka] I have no doubt about this. I experienced views like this in the former federal government as the

former federal minister of the economy when I went to the Russian Federation, to Ukraine, for discussions. But today it is becoming apparent that the former politicians, so to speak, overdid things a little and are now striving very intensively for favors on the Russian and Ukrainian markets because, potentially, these are very strong markets which, to a large extent, can solve the problems of our economy which is becoming more and more dynamic. [end recording]

Statistical Office Issues July Economic Statistics

AU0309131893 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 31 Aug 93 p 1

[TA SR report: "A Summer Sleigh Ride"]

[Text] Bratislava—Consumer prices for goods and services in July increased—compared with the previous month—by 1.1 percent. Prices for foodstuffs increased by 1.5 percent; for non- foodstuffs by 1.2 percent; for services by 0.6 percent; and for public catering by 0.4 percent. During the first seven months of the year, prices increased—compared with last December—by 15.5 percent. This information comes from a report on the basic trends in the development of selected sectors of the Slovak national economy in July of this year, which the Slovak Statistical Office handed to TA SR yesterday.

The cost of living in July, compared with June, increased by 1.1 percent; the figure was the same for families in all social groups. Compared with December 1992, the cost of living has increased by 14.1 percent. The inflation rate (increases calculated from the consumer price index) in July rose by 1.1 percent compared with June. It had increased by 15.5 percent since the end of last year.

There were 339,372 registered unemployed in Slovakia at the end of July—some 21,290 more than in June. There were 45,139 newly registered unemployed—6,195 more than in June. Some 23,849 people came off the unemployment register; 9,000 of them entered into employment. The level of registered unemployment was 13.3 percent and—compared with June—it rose by 0.8 percent.

The overall number of enterprises and companies increased by 638 to 22,643 (private, cooperative, international, and foreign) owing to the formation of the private sector. Of the overall 25,762 organizations, 87.9 percent (87.6 percent in May) were private enterprises.

In agriculture, compared with June, the number of pigs increased, while the number of beef cattle, poultry, and sheep fell. Milk production declined by 3.5 percent and egg production declined by 7.1 percent.

The state budget had a deficit of 14.1 billion korunas in July.

Jeszenszky on EDU Conference, NATO Membership

AU0709093793 Budapest PESTI HIRLAP in Hungarian 4 Sep 93 p 11

[Interview with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by Laszlo Gog; place and date not given: "Neutrality Has Lost Its Meaning"]

[Text] [Gog] In its final document, the EDU conference states that a European security system can only be envisaged within NATO, including the presence and responsibility of the United States and Canada. [Czech Prime Minister] Vaclav Klaus said that he did not favor a quick NATO membership because this would only strengthen the U.S. military presence, and he asked whether Hungary makes this clear.

[Jeszenszky] Hungary's leaders were the first among the former communist countries to call for preserving the U.S. presence in Europe. This caused considerable surprise in the West in 1989-90 because the West thought that neutrality was the dream of noncommunist leaders in the former communist countries. I already claimed at that time that, actually, neutrality only had a sense in war. Given the fact that the Cold War has ended, neutrality has also lost its meaning. This is our old conviction based on historical facts: European security needs the United States, and the several crises in the 20th century prove this, when the results would have probably been totally different without America, particularly regarding World War II.

It is a narrow approach to claim that NATO is not so important and that it costs a lot of money. Now that there are finally no foreign occupying forces in Hungary after 450 years of constant foreign military presence, we must maintain this neutrality and we must make use of every means to see to it that our freedom and independence are not endangered, weak, or dependent on others. The European security system is extremely important for us, and it is also important that our immediate and more distant neighbors should also belong to this system, because this would mean not only defense but also guarantees against any bad intentions. I am convinced that only NATO can provide this stability, a NATO that successfully survived the Cold War and is successfully adjusting to the post-Cold War conditions.

[Gog] Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock said that he envisaged Hungary's NATO membership sometime at the end of the 1990's, and this statement is in harmony with German Defense Minister Wolker Ruhe's recent statement, namely that Hungary would become a NATO members sooner than a EC member, because even the most optimistic forecasts think of Hungary's EC membership sometime at the turn of the century.

[Jeszenszky] Starting from the premise that full EC membership indeed has economic and other criteria whose fulfillment could take a few more years, I think it is realistic to think that the possible NATO membership—something that is not automatic either—could be an easier task.

[Gog] Although not officially, the idea of the so-called Small-NATO repeatedly emerged during the EDU conference. What is your opinion on this?

[Jeszenszky] I heard about this, but I do not regard it as a realistic concept. The Central-European countries in themselves are weak. Of course, a closer cooperation between the Visegrad Group is a realistic goal, but I do not think that we could create an independent security system, one situated east of NATO and one that could efficiently guarantee our security.

Jeszenszky Sees Bigger NATO Bringing Stability

LD0709201893 Budapest MTI in English 1720 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] Vienna, September 7 (MTI)—Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky said at a Central European conference on Tuesday [7 September] that a bigger NATO would create stability in the region.

He debated remarks made at the conference that minorities have exaggerated demands in many central European countries. On the contrary, he said, demands by minorities are very modest, especially compared to rights for ethnic groups in the West.

Defence Minister Meets With Swedish Counterpart

LD0709200493 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Excerpts] Our correspondent Peter Marvanyi reports from Sweden on our Defense Minister Lajos Fur's talks there:

[Marvanyi] The present European organizations do not have a coordinated policy on the Balkans, said Lajos Fur, Hungarian minister of defense, and his Swedish counterpart Anders Bjorck, at their talks today. The host country, which is a neutral state, would agree with reforming and expanding NATO, but as the Stockholm defense minister explained in his statement to Hungarian radio, the transformation of NATO is only one of the possible ways of solving the continent's affairs and conflicts effectively, and reforming NATO is not tomorrow's issue—not even that of the day after tomorrow. Anyway, Sweden is not a member of the organization, therefore they do not have a chance to speed up this process. [passage omitted]

As regards Hungarian-Swedish military issues, Lajos Fur said after the talks, I quote: The future possibilities of a cooperation in military technology must be examined. This very cautious statement obviously means that no specific agreement in specific matters can be expected in the near future. The development of concrete relations is obviously conceivable in the sphere of air defense.

Hungary Supports Romania's Integration Into Europe

LD0609152493 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 6 Sep 93

[Text] The parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee is supporting Romania's integration into Europe. This is what Geza Jeszenszky said after the parliament's foreign affairs session, when he briefed the deputies on the cabinet's stance concerning Romania's admission to the Council of Europe.

Summing up the opinion of the body, the foreign minister said that the parties in Hungary agree that it would be a good thing if Bucharest confirms its application with tangible guarantees for which it can be called to account. The committee is of the view that Romania's admission to the Council of Europe can improve the situation of the Hungarians in Transylvania and also promote Romanian-Hungarian relations.

Parliament Ratifies Visegrad Free Trade Agreement

LD0709194293 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Excerpt] Hungary's [highest] legislative body has ratified unanimously a National Assembly resolution on the free trade agreement between central European countries. The treaty, which was signed last December in Krakow by the economy ministers of Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland significantly improves access to markets in the countries concerned. At the same time, according to Bela Kadar, minister of international economic relations, the treaty sends an important message to the world that the countries of the region have the political will for cooperation.

The minister's wish for the vote to signal that there is consensus in Hungarian political life has also been fulfilled—the vote was unanimous. [passage omitted]

Finance Minister Views Monetary Issues

LD0809162293 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0400 GMT 8 Sep 93

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Dear listeners, the guest of our program this morning is Finance Minister Ivan Szabo, and I ask him now to tell us the precise figures of the Hungarian state credit and debt stock. What sort of new loans do we need, for what purpose, and what are the prospects of these loans?

[Szabo] The question is rather complex and I think I can only give you rough figures, without elaborating on their content. The gross state debt is between $20 and 21 billion, the net debt was considerably less, recently was $12 to 13 billion. The internal debt stock consequence of this in forints, together with the losses caused by the change in exchange rate policy, is about 1.6 to 1.7 trillion forints. On top of this, there is the budget and social security deficit which has developed in the past three years, so in my estimation, by the end of this year, the internal state debt measured in forints will be registered as about 2 trillion.

At the moment financing this debt is carried out from the population's savings and this is done via government bonds and savings securities. Independently of this, the economic sector can obtain considerable credits from the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the IMF, which are to be considered as credits for special purposes and not as public finance credits.

[Announcer] I know this is difficult, but how could you explain this debt stock in layman's terms for the Hungarian citizen?

[Szabo] Well, the total state debt in forints is about twice as much as the stock of population savings in the building societies. But I can also say that it is about one and half times more than the revenue side of the yearly budget of the country.

[Announcer] What are the figures of Hungarian inflation and what is the trend?

[Szabo] Inflation in Hungary is expected to be about 20-22 percent by the end of the year, which is nearly as much as last year's figure of 23 percent. So it seems that nothing much has happened. [passage omitted]

I think it is important to mention that the inflation price index has been showing a downward tendency month after month and there is no pressure from the production side either, for the production price index is about at the 10 percent level or below, which is undoubtedly promising for the future.

[Announcer] Is there any news about the chances of total convertibility of the forint?

[Szabo] An announcement about this cannot be expected in the near future. [passage omitted] I have to say that in commercial life, convertibility is practically complete and the present form does not interfere with economic life. It is likely that total convertibility will have to wait for another year, a year and a half.

Industrial Production up 1.6 Percent in First 6 Months

LD0609171693 Budapest MTI in English 1615 GMT 6 Sep 93

[Text] Budapest, September 6 (MTI)—Hungary's industrial production showed only meagre growth of 1.6 per cent between the first half of 1992 and the first half of 1993, an Industry and Trade Ministry official told the press on Monday.

Deputy State Secretary Istvan Kocsis said by that Central Statistical Office figures, industrial production over the first six months was HUF [Hungarian forint] 1,110

billion, HUF 856.8 billion of it for domestic use, and HUF 232.9 billion for export. Simultaneously with the growth in industrial production, energy consumption fell by 0.5 per cent.

In the first half of 1993, processing output grew by 1.2 per cent, while mining output fell 20 per cent against the first six months of 1992. Engineering production grew by 12.1 per cent, in line with production of building materials.

Smallholder Groups Planning To Form United Party

AU0709162093 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 4 Sep 93 p 4

[Correspondent's report: "Incomplete Unity at the Smallholders'"]

[Text] After a scandalous interlude in Parliament on 3 September, the heads of the conservative, historical, and national factions of the Smallholders' Party decided to unite their parties. However, given the fact that the national leadership of the Conservative Smallholders' and Citizens' Party did not authorize the move, the unification of the aforementioned parties is highly questionable.

At the beginning of the talks, Istvan Morvai, who represents the historical wing, questioned the legitimacy of Laszlo Csizmadia, a delegate of the Conservative Smallhoders, and asked him to leave the room. The executive deputy chairman of the Conservative Smallholders, Gyula Lehoczky, who was the other member of the delegation, also left with Laszlo Csizmadia. However, former party chairman and currently presidium member Bela Nemeth remained in the negotiating room, and "nominated" Tibor Jankovics as delegate.

"The document about unification is anyway invalid"—Emese Ugrin told us. "The 21-member National Presidium only authorized the three delegates to hold joint and coordination talks, but the National Presidium has the right to decide. In addition, Bela Nemeth also authorized this decision, so I do not know on what basis he took private action.

According to Lehoczky and Csizmadia, at its meeting planned for 19 September, the National Council will expel the former chairman involved in "private actions." Answering our correspondent's question, Bela Nemeth declared that he drew authorization from the members who have been desiring unity in the Smallhoders Party for a long time, and he regarded the national leadership's no-confidence motion as illegal and the document on the unification of the party as legal.

Parliament To Discuss 102 Bills Before May Elections

AU0309141493 Budapest MTI in English 1658 GMT 2 Sep 93

[Text] Budapest, 2 Sep (MTI)—Hungary's government proposes MPs discuss 50 bills over the next six months, and another 52 in the remainder of their office term until general elections due next May, Prime Minister's Office Administrative State Secretary Jozsef Kajdi said at the government spokeswoman's briefing today.

The proposed schedule is as follows:

September: Amending the civil code, the criminal code and courts, laws on railways and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences

October: Budgetary regulations, laws on prosecution, the police and the army, amending the electoral law

November: Debate on next year's budget, taxes and duties

December: Legislation on referendums, social security, social-welfare provisions, economic chambers, and land use.

Justice Minister Insists on Katyn Inquiry

WS0809111193 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 0530 GMT 8 Sep 93

[From the "Panorama" newscast]

[Text] Minister of Justice Jan Piatkowski does not intend to change his decision to have the Warsaw Prosecutor's Office conduct an independent investigation into the Katyn massacre. He explained that he was basing his right to make such a decision on the law governing the Public Prosecutor's Office and on Article 115 of the Penal Code. Minister Piatkowski added that only he, as prosecutor general, has the power to make such a decision. The justice minister will submit explanations in the case at the government's presidium meeting tomorrow.

Walesa Interviewed on Democracy, Presidential Program

LD0709202793 Warsaw PAP in English 1344 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 7—President Lech Walesa on Tuesday [7 September] in an interview granted to PAP said that he would address a letter to leaders of political parties and groupings referring to, as he put it, "the main pillars of the state."

The president added that if the left won the elections, he would show respect for democracy and entrust one of three candidates of a victorious party with a mission of forming a new cabinet.

Commenting on a statement by head of the Cabinet Office Jan Maria Rokita that the president would not be able to cooperate with the leftist government, Lech Walesa said, "I am the greatest democrat and I will show respect for democracy. As a president I have to take into consideration all the facts. I must have solutions to all potential situations, also to a situation the democracy will create after the elections."

Asked whether he might cooperate with the left, Walesa replied, "I would have no other choice. I would not propose a civil war to the nation. Either there is democracy, either there is a right to vote and one ought to exercise it and respect it or there is not."

When asked what he would do if the left won and there are protests of political parties and a part of the nation, the president said that he is prepared for that but cannot reveal now what solutions he has in store. "I will not allow anyone to destroy and burn our Polish home," he added.

Speaking about the reaction of the West towards the potential victory of the left in elections and a belief that it might hold back reforms in Poland, the president said that we are living in a transition period when the definitions of the right and left have to be made anew.

"It (the left's victory) was dangerous when the Soviet Union existed, when decisions were taken in Moscow. The contemporary left is different, there is a lot of young people there." He added that he cannot consent to bad development of the country and simultaneously has to meet the challenges of democracy—both externally from the east and the west and internally.

"I will try to fulfil my duties and lead the country through reform even if I happen to do it with the postcommunist left."

When asked to refer to a statement he made in Gdansk a few days ago that he will ask the new prime minister whether he would be supporting and implementing the presidential programme, Lech Walesa answered that he had thought that the president should not have a programme and only ought to say how he will act and where he will head but the majority of politicians forced him to present the programme of his own.

"Today I am being burdened with the fact that the programme is not being implemented. Therefore I will demand from the premier that he makes a declaration as far as my programme goes."

Asked whether it is necessary to implement the presidential programme as the best one, Walesa said that there is no doubt about that. "If my programme was being implemented, Poland would have been in a different place now," he said.

When questioned whether he is not afraid of the situation when the PM refuses to implement his programme and there are tensions between the president and the government, Walesa said, "Today everything that is bad has its roots in the fact that my programme is not being implemented. I am blamed for unemployment... I am whistled down for privatization..., prosecutors..., legal system..., One cannot demand the implementation (of someting), without giving the executive powers. Of course we are only beginning to build but the nation has to understand what the governing in democracy consists in."

The president added that in the present system in Poland it is the government that should be the executor of the president's programme. "We have to decide whether the president is more linked with the executive power or he should be eliminated altogether... maybe the president is not necessary. If so, let the prime minister take over his duties," stated Walesa.

Once again referring back to his speech delivered in Gdansk, the president said that he mentioned three pillars on which the state should be built. These are culture and science, health and social service, and internal and external security.

The president plans to address a letter to political parties to let them list things they consider pillars of the state

and propose how to protect them. He maintains that the stability of these pillars should be guaranteed at least for four years.

The president was also asked what would be his scenario for a situation when after the September 19 parliamentary elections the Polish political scene is still partitioned, coalition majority not created and a premier not designated. He replied that everything indicates that in such a situation he will have to call into being a presidential party.

"I do not want to apply this variant but I have agreed to be the president in a transition period to lead Poland safely through reform...democracy, freedom, multiparty system, free market and this has to be binding in Poland and will be. I would prefer democracy to do these things without a leader but if I once again had to be the leader, I would," said the president.

Lech Walesa also revealed that he and his entire family are going to vote for the Non-Party Reform Bloc (BBWR).

Possible Parliamentary Seat Distribution Viewed

WS0809114293 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 4-5 Sep 93 p 2

[Report by Renata Wrobel: "Public Opinion Research Institute (PBS) for RZECZPOSPOLITA; Forecast of Deputy Seats"]

[Text] **The Democratic Union [UD] and the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] would each have as many as 100 deputies and would occupy nearly 50 percent of the Sejm seats—on condition, however, that at the Sunday, 19 September election Poles vote just as they declared they would vote in the August opinion poll, conducted for RZECZPOSPOLITA by the Public Opinion Research Institute. In such a case, the parliament would be comprised of deputies of eight parties, excluding national minorities. The poll was conducted on 28 and 29 August on a group of almost 2,000 adults.**

In line with the poll results, the 391 seats, obtained from district lists, would be distributed among the following parties: UD, SLD, PSL [Polish Peasant Party], UP [Labor Union], NSZZ "S" [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarity"], KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland], BBWR [Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms], and KLD [Liberal-Democratic Congress]. This is because only those parties would exceed the limit of 5 percent required by the Electoral Law. The researchers from Sopot divided the seats on the basis of an analysis of predicted election results in nine macroregions. They did not take into account the seats for national minorities, which would probably not be very numerous, and which may be exempted from the obligation to exceed 5 percent.

The remaining 69 seats, which will be occupied by candidates running on all-national lists, would be given to those election committees which obtained at least 7 percent of the votes throughout Poland: UD (21 seats), SLD (20 seats), PSL (16), and UP (12).

It is obvious that the Electoral Law favors stronger parties. UD, in line with the poll results, would obtain 16 percent of the votes and would have 25 percent of the parliamentary seats; SLD would obtain the support of 15 percent of the voters, which would mean 24 percent of the seats; PSL would get 12 percent of the votes and consequently, 19 percent of the seats. "Solidarity" for example, would receive the support of 7 percent of the voters and the same percent of the Sejm seats.

To Believe or Not To Believe?

While making all these predictions, we must bear one thing in mind: this is a purely theoretical, rough forecast, based on the premises that the opinion poll was very accurate and, in addition, that in two weeks' time the election preferences will not change. This, however, is hardly possible in 1993 Poland, when so many parties are running in the elections. There is also another consideration: Voters often decide at the last moment.

The opinion poll results must also be regarded cautiously. This is not because it was done badly, but simply because political life in Poland sometimes cannot be reflected in this kind of research. The fact that different poll centers obtained different results at the same time, proves the point.

Let us, for example, compare the results of polls by PBS and CBOS [Public Opinion Research Center], conducted last weekend. According to PBS, the three leading parties are: UD (16 percent of the "votes"), SLD (15 percent), and PSL (12 percent). In the CBOS ranking, the same three parties are in the lead, but in a different order and with different support: SdRP—because the center presents the party to the respondents under this name—has 15 percent of "votes," PSL—13 percent, and UD—12 percent.

Moreover, According to CBOS

* Parliamentary seats will be beyond the reach of KPN (3 percent of the votes, while in the Sopot-based PBS—7 percent) and KLD (3 percent, whereas in the PBS poll—5 percent);

* UP (6 percent) and "Solidarity" (5 percent) will receive smaller support than in the PBS poll (9 and 7 percent respectively);

* The X Party will obtain seats in the parliament (5 percent, whereas in the PBS poll only 3 percent);

* The ratings of BBWR are the same—in both centers, 6 percent.

Let us note that at some points there is a significant similarity in the results, and all differences are within the limits of a statistical error, which is 2 to 3 percent. If we dealt with two or three large parties, with a rather stable

electorate, fluctuations that might be caused by statistical laws would not be as important. However, when people's votes are distributed among many parties, the majority of which obtain several percent and the strongest a little over a dozen percent of support, this factor becomes very important.

[Box, p 5]

This is how the parliament might look:

Altogether: 460 seats
UD—114
SLD—112
PSL—89
UP—55
"S"—30
BBWR—24
KPN—21
KLD—15

Politicians View Integration with NATO

WS0809115693 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 7 Sep 93 p 1

[Report by Z.L.: "We and They In NATO"]

[Text]**The idea of a military alliance with the West is supported by 76.3 percent of the professional soldiers. Only 16.6 percent of the army professionals would gladly see the Republic of Poland conclude defense pacts with East European states. An overwhelming majority, more than 75 percent of the army cadres, believe that "it is desirable" that Poland join NATO.**

"Only the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is able to ensure security in Europe," say bluntly a little over two-thirds of the young (under the age of 25) respondents, questioned by the Military Institute of Sociological Research. Sociologists claim that in recent years they have been witnessing a steady increase in the approval for government activities aimed at Poland's association with NATO. As recently as a year ago, the efforts of politicians who were leaning toward Brussels were not supported so unequivocally. According to opinion polls conducted at that time, 35 percent supported this option. Today this opinion is expressed by 57 percent of the respondents, not only from military circles. Among the advocates of integration with NATO, the majority believes that this step could be considered as a "national profit." Fewer respondents say that both sides would benefit if Poland joined NATO.

Among the respondents declaring leftist views, there are both opponents and supporters of Poland's association with NATO; however, there are more skeptics. Right wing supporters, even though they are also divided, more determinedly advocate the "pro-NATO" direction of transformations in the state's defense doctrine.

"If SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] should came to power, the process of integration with NATO would be slowed down," states Janusz Onyszkiewicz, minister of national defense, Sejm deputy candidate running on a UD [Democratic Union] ticket.

"The minister should not frighten anyone. It is not true that SLD objects to Poland's integration with NATO," claims Zbigniew Siemiatkowski of the SLD election headquarters. "We believe, however, that certain conditions would have to be met before this integration could actually take place. First of all, in line with what Krzysztof Skubiszewski, minister of foreign affairs, said a year ago, the process of nearing NATO should be accompanied by a policy of consolidating the structures of CSCE [Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe]. The left, united in SLD, expects that, as the international situation changes, there will also be an adjustment within NATO itself, the structure of which has so far met the challenge of a different time. We cannot agree that Poland, which will be a part of the alliance in the future, play the role of a buffer state, a kind of first wall of the West in our part of Europe. The Polish Republic could rather play the role of a bridge," says Siemiatkowski.

Parliament Continues Discussions on Corruption Report

AU0709184093 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1706 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 7/9/1993—Romania's two houses met in a joint session Tuesday, September 7. The plenum was announced that late at night the motion tabled by 150 opposition deputies, which asked the government to dissociate itself from a few of its members, involved in corruption cases, was voted out. From the 482 parliamentarians of the two houses, 382 cast their votes, of whom 151 voted for and 242 against. The motion would have needed 242 fors, namely half plus one of the total number of parliamentarians.

The parliament is discussing today a second preliminary report on corruption which includes a number of items not all the members of Anti-Corruption Parliamentary Commission have agreed on.

Some 100 people demonstrated Tuesday, September 7, in front of Parliament's building asking that the houses abusively passed into the hands of the state in the first years of the communist regime be given back to their rightful owners through a legislative act. No incident was reported.

Melescanu Letter Refutes UDMR Memorandum

AU0809104493 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 3 Sep 93 pp 1, 2

[Letter by Teodor Melescanu, minister of foreign affairs, to Mrs. Catherine Lalumiere, general secretary of the Council of Europe, place and date not given: "The Romanian Foreign Minister's Letter to Mrs. Lalumiere"]

[Text] Mrs. General Secretary,

To begin with, I would like to express again—on behalf of the Romanian Government and myself personally—our particular satisfaction at having had you as guest of honor in Romania. The substantial discussions we conducted during your visit are of special significance at this important time, when the Council of Europe is going to pass a decision on Romania's admittance. I hope that your findings during your recent visit have strengthened your conviction about the irreversibility of the process of democratic reform along which my country has firmly engaged.

During your Bucharest news conference, a Hungarian journalist asked you a question about a memorandum of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR]. I must tell you that, at that time, we completely ignored the existence of such a document. I learned about it from the Hungarian-language press in Romania, after your departure from the country. In view of the caliber of the signatories of that memorandum and the way in which the situation in Romania is presented, we deem it useful to make a few remarks about the content of that memorandum, in light of our talks in Bucharest.

Of course, each party is entitled to present its viewpoints and publicize them through whatever means it considers fit, even though the practice of taking one's complaints abroad, instead of resorting to the democratic structures in one's own country, in whose favor they claim to plead, can only cast doubts on one's good will. As a matter of fact, such a conclusion also seems to be confirmed by the UDMR decision to withdraw from the Consultative Council of National Minorities, a body whose usefulness was recognized by all the Romanian political forces, as well as by many foreign organizations and observers, including yourself and Mr. Van der Stoel, the CSCE high commissioner for national minorities. By negating any achievements along the road of Romanian society's democratization, the memorandum actually strives to justify the true position of the signatories, according to which Romania should not be admitted to the Council of Europe. Such a position runs counter to the true national consensus in favor of the country's admittance to the Council, a consensus which you were able to ascertain yourself. There is consensus on the fact that the admittance could accelerate and consolidate the ongoing process of democratic reforms. The inopportuneness of this position is all the more obvious as it places UDMR outside the general trend and might actually elicit adverse reaction, rather than empathy for the problems UDMR claims to be faced with.

Regarding the core of the problems raised, the memorandum contains two kinds of observations. Some of them are of a general nature, and we can only agree with them. Therefore, we ask ourselves what they wanted to prove by making them. Remarks according to which the social changes that took place in the country have not yet led to the "equality of chances," or the "modernization" of education, and so forth are naturally true and reflect our aspirations too, of all of us. But our country is involved in a difficult process along the road of reaching such ideals. To claim that the nonfulfillment of these ideals represents an obstacle for Romania's admittance to the Council of Europe is tantamount to an unserious approach to the matter, hence not worthy of consideration.

A second category of observations abounds in untruths and falsifications. Such an untruth is the statement that the current power tolerates nationalistic manifestations or that it sometimes encourages such manifestations. It is a known fact that, on 10 July this year, Romania's president personally intervened through a letter sent to the General Prosecutor, whereby he urgently asked him to officially investigate and take adequate measures against such manifestations, in keeping with the country's law and constitution.

The memorandum also claims that people who do not speak the official language too well would be at a "disadvantage"—the implication being that Romania is

implementing a policy of ethnic assimilation. Aside from the fact that such statements are untrue and that any country in the world would find it unacceptable that its citizens should not know the official state language, one should raise the following elementary question: If indeed, Romania has been conducting a policy of assimilation since 1918, as it is claimed in the memorandum, then this should have led to the loss of knowledge of the mother tongue, in favor of the official tongue; how come then that the Hungarian ethnics are blaming us for their difficulties in using the Romanian language, which they claim they do not know, and are asking for interpreters in order to be able to communicate with the authorities?

The sixth point of the memorandum invokes the fact that the absence of a law on local budgets allegedly serves the interests of the central political will. Allow me to mention that there is a law on local public administration, applicable throughout Romania's territory, in whose drafting the UDMR representatives also took part. As a matter of fact, the memorandum refers to other laws, too, such as the law on the audio-visual means, land stock, and so forth, adopted by the very Parliament in which UDMR is represented. On the other hand, the memorandum casts doubts on the very constitution which was adopted by national referendum, something which defies the norms of democracy.

Regarding the allegation that the state financially supports certain parties or political movements in Parliament, I would like to emphasize that no party in Romania is financed from the state budget. On the other hand, Romania is among the countries with a political party like UDMR—founded on ethnic criteria and substantially represented in Parliament—and with a parliamentary group consisting of a representative of each minority other than the Hungarian one, which did not reach the necessary level for representation in the legislative forum. Consequently, the representatives of the Hungarian ethnic group have the possibility of directly promoting solutions for the problems of their concern, within the country's Parliament.

The aforementioned points represent only a part of the many untruths and falsifications contained in the memorandum.

At the same time, I would like to inform you that the UDMR leaders have sent a letter on the same issues to Mr. Jansson, rapporteur of the Legal and Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe in charge of Romania. In this case, too, I learned of the content of this letter also from the Hungarian-language press in Romania.

Although the memorandum of the UDMR leaders is not at all convincing in its tackling of the democratization process in Romania, it nevertheless gives clear expression to their political goals. At point no. 3, the memorandum claims, for instance, that "as of 1918, the minority elements were marginalized." In view of the fact that, until 1918, the aforementioned "elements" were still the dominant power in an empire, this complaint about "marginalizaton" indubitably signifies a demand for a return to their previous status. That this is their political objective is also attested by the fact that they are challenging the constitutional provision according to which Romania is a national and unitary state as well as the complaint that the minorities are not recognized as founding "factors" of the state. These claims have nothing in common with the issue of human rights and minorities, and represent a serious affront to the national unity and territorial integrity of the Romanian state, something which is totally unacceptable.

Expressing the hope that you will give a correct interpretation to my taking a stand on the issue of the memorandum and that you will show your characteristic objectivity in tackling these problems, please receive, Mrs. General Secretary, the expression of my highest esteem and regard.

PUNR Aims 'To Effectively Participate in Government'

AU0809105293 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 2 Sep 93 p 4

[Interview with Ioan Gavra, vice president of the Romanian National Unity Party, by Mihail Dumitru Sandu; place and date not given: "We Support This Government Conditionally"]

[Text] [Sandu] Is there any confirmation for rumors that the breach between the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] and the presidency and between PUNR and the prime minister is currently intensifying?

[Gavra] The PUNR has not supported, does not support, and will not support President Iliescu only because he has been elected by the electorate. It was not the PUNR which proposed him as president or voted for him in the political sense of the word. The closeness between the PUNR and the president was rather artificial. We conducted a dialogue with Mr. Iliescu about solving certain social and economic problems throughout the country, but primarily in Transylvanian localities. That's all. President Iliescu has been elected and therefore he has to be respected like the constitution, irrespective of his political color. As far as the government is concerned, things stand completely differently. We favored a certain government formula, we did not form any kind of political alliance, neither with the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania], nor with the other parties supporting the Vacaroiu government; our support was only at the executive level. The conditions we set were several: Regarding the social-economic reform and territorial representation. We demanded that in places where the PUNR is better represented to effectively participate in public and local organizations. A great part of these demands were met, others remained unsolved. There is great dissatisfaction with the government activity and especially with how the ruling party is working at the regional level, and how it treats the

PUNR county branches. This way of work, which is probably promoted at the central level, pursues the idea of decapitating the PUNR.

[Sandu] Have you undertaken anything to unblock this relationship?

[Gavra] The time has come to demand what we demanded at the very beginning; the first condition is a partial government reshuffle, which was practically achieved prior to 1 September. There will be other government changes, thus we are not talking only of cosmetic changes. The essential problem continues to be whether to support this government or not. Thus it will not be an unconditional support, but a conditional one, not in the sense of primarily acquiring government positions, but in the sense of continuing the reform process and implementing the government strategy as it was formulated by Mr. Vacaroiu. The discussions will be frank, that is the achievements of the government will be examined; in actual fact, the prime minister will present a white paper on the government activity for one year. From an economic point of view, we will not demand a velvet reform, as has happened so far, but the transition to privatization. Therefore, we propose two portfolios within the government structure: a ministry for coordination of privatization, thus linking privatization directly to the executive power; a ministry for natural resources and energy and even a ministry of information. We will discuss this question in the next two weeks and then we will see whether to support the government team or not. Our intention is to dynamize each and every area and to effectively participate in government. A monocolor government formula is out of place.

[Sandu] To what did Mr. Gheorghe Funar [PUNR leader] refer when he mentioned President Ion Iliescu's "minority?"

[Gavra] I think it was a figure of speech. Through Mr. Traian Chebeleu [presidency spokesman], the president said that he supports the demand of the Council of Minorities. This means that there are discussions on bilingual issues, on its proportion of 10 and 30 percent, and on introducing the study of Romanian history and geography in the mother tongue (of minorities) in the sense of obtaining additional places—in the Hungarian language—in the pedagogical institute of Cluj University, and on other such questions, which do not belong to the competence of the presidency. The president does not make legislative suggestions. The president's fundamental role within the democratic system is to ensure the observation of Romania's laws and Constitution. Therefore, such initiatives on the part of President Ion Iliescu are rather odd. It is not the president who sees to the solution of the problems of minorities in Romania, but the parliament. This was what the PUNR president discussed.

[Sandu] Within the current context, Mr. Funar criticized the presidency and the prime minister; he said that some files might be construed on him.

[Gavra] Certainly, Mr. Funar has become an inconvenient person, thus he thinks of consequences. These things are not new in Romania; they are practiced at the international level as well. When someone becomes inconvenient from the political point of view, there are attempts to eliminate him by various means. And one of such means is concocting some files.

Muslims Tell of Deaths, Rape in Croatian Camps

AU0709185393 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] There are three camps in the Kresevo commune where Muslim civilians are being kept, B-H PRESS has learned from refugees from Kresevo. There are also displaced people in these camps, who just happened to be in the town when the fighting broke out.

In a camp near Sunja, in a private hall near the Barica mine, there are 250 prisoners, among whom is Ibrahim Efendi Alisovac. After being captured, this former official from the Gazihusevbeg Treasury in Sarajevo was transferred to Kiseljak, where he was beaten and from there transported, unable to move, to the camp near Sunja.

The refugees testify that four men have been killed so far. Men over 55 are kept in Dostanica, in a private house belonging to Mustafa Stevovagic. The Croatian Defense Council [HVO] does not spare women either. Approximately 400 Muslim women are held in the house of Enver Merdan, in the former Dobrovoljacka Street. The Muslims from the camp near Sunja and the women held have to perform the most demanding physical labor every day while a few of the women have also been raped.

HVO soldiers demolished a mosque in Kresevo that was over 500 years old. They burnt down the villages of Buzici and Brniki, and other Muslim settlements.

The HVO extremists are still refusing to allow representatives of international humanitarian organizations to enter Kresevo.

UNHCR Spokesman Protests Croatian Atricities

AU0709121993 Paris AFP in English 1155 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] Zagreb, Sept 7 (AFP)—The UNHCR spokesman in Sarajevo on Tuesday [7 September] issued a strong protest against atrocities reportedly being committed in two detention camps run by Bosnian Croat forces in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The UNHCR "recommends that the strongest pressure be exerted on the Bosnian Croat authorities at the highest level regarding the reported grave breaches of humanitarian international laws clearly conducted at Dretelj and Gabela," said UNHCR spoksman Ray Wilkinson.

He said the International Commitee of the Red Cross hopes to enter the camp at Dretelj but "given the past difficulties, this is obviously not assured."

The two camps are near the southern city of Mostar, hit with heavy fighting and where Croat forces have besieged the Muslim quarter.

UN Report: Bosnian Serbs Holding 15,000 Muslims

AU0709182793 Paris AFP in English 1805 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] Geneva, Sept 7 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs are currently holding some 15,000 Moslem prisoners in 10 camps in Bosnia-Hercegovina, special UN human rights investigator Tadeusz Mazowiecki disclosed in a report made public here Tuesday [7 September].

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) meanwhile reported that it had already registered 4,200 Moslem prisoners in Croatian camps located in Dretelj, Gabela and Rodoc in southern Bosnia-Hercegovina.

"There are also reports indicating that other detention sites exist in the region," the ICRC said. It added that its delegates had been authorized to visit the camps "after long and difficult negotiations that began in late June."

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees on Monday said Moslem prisoners released from the Dretelj and Gabela camps reported that they had been tortured, deprived of water, fed but once a day and kept in closed, fetid chambers.

Mazowiecki, in his account, wrote that most of the 15,000 Moslems were being held at a heliport in Rodoc, a former arms depot in Gabela and in facilities south of Caplinha and in Dretelj. But he added that smaller detention sites were located in Otoci, Grabovina, Mostar, Caplinja, Ljubuski and Trebizat.

The report said the most of the detainees were being held either to force the release of Croats captured by Moslems, to serve as human shields or to serve in labor details.

At the Rodoc camp, according to Mazowiecki, Moslem prisoners have been used by Bosnian Croats to reinforce trenches on the front lines, where several have already been killed.

The report cited information—which is still to be confirmed—that mainly Muslim Bosnian army troops had captured an undetermined number of Croats and Serbs, who were subsequently forced to dig ditches and fill sandbags. But they too could be used as human shields, according to the report.

HVO Chief: All Prison Camps for Muslims Abolished

LD0709153993 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] At a news conference given in connection with some untrue reports on Muslims imprisoned in Croat-run camps, Major General Slobodan Praljak, chief of staff of the Croatian Defense Council, said that all the camps have been abolished and stressed that the Red Cross has refused to take over people from them. General Praljak said that all the camps are open to visitors

and that all teams of journalists can see them for themselves. However, editors of many television stations have failed to broadcast reports on them, he said.

Muslim Offensive Reported on Mount Igman

LD0709141093 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1306 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] Bratunac, September 7 (TANJUG)—Moslem formations continued offensive combat activities on Mt Igman following withdrawal of the Bosnian Serb Army on August 16, the Bosnian Serbs' military sources warned.

Bosnian Serb officers and UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] began work Tuesday [7 September] on the mixed commission whose task it is to stabilize ceasefire in the area of Mt Igman near Sarajevo, TANJUG has learned from the same sources.

The Moslem formations have over the past few days on several occasions opened fire on the positions of Bosnian Serbs. This activity ceased only after UNPROFOR intervened, the sources said.

Ceasefire came into force in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on July 30, while the Moslem formations violated daily both this accord and the ceasefire agreement reached between the representatives of the Bosnian Serbs and Moslems in Geneva last Wednesday.

Muslim, Croatian Clashes Continue in Central Bosnia

LD0809095293 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 8 Sep 93

[Text] Fighting between the Muslim Army and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] raged in the area of Vitez throughout the night. Civilian targets were shelled and one person was killed.

Sporadic artillery attacks along with constant sniper actions also continued in Novi Travnik. Fierce fighting also took place on the Zepce-Zavidovici battlefield. Muslim infantry tried to penetrate the Zavidovici villages of Biljacic and Dubravice, while in the Zepce municipality they attacked the village of Orlovik. In yesterday's attacks one person was killed while six others sustained injuries.

In the area of Mostar, Rama, and Dreznica, near Jablanica, Muslim forces engaged in constant provocations. They opened artillery fire on Bucic and Bijelo Polje, north of Mostar, throughout the night. They were also opening mortar fire on HVO positions on the Hum hill. The Serbs opened artillery fire on HVO positions in southeastern Herzegovina.

Croatian Shelling Causes 'Enormous' Damage in Mostar

AU0709184593

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian in a 32-minute news bulletin at 1700 GMT on 7 September carries several reports on the fighting in the republic.

The Mostar Press Center reports that "eight people, of whom five were children, died on the streets of Mostar this evening after a sudden intense shelling by tank grenades fired by the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] and the Croatian Army. The attack on the residential quarters of the town took place immediately after EC envoys had left Mostar. The Croatian attackers exclusively targeted civilian buildings in the unprotected old Mostar [word indistinct]." The report adds that "enormous material damage was also caused." "At the time of this dispatch, Mostar is enveloped in thick smoke and dust" while "many old houses along the Neretva River are burning," the report says.

Nijaz Banjalovic reports from the Zvornik Press Center that "in the morning the chetniks started shelling civilian areas and then also the front lines. The hamlets of (?Nezuk), Kobilici, Vitnice, and Kovacevici came under the shelling. Over 200 shells from 82-mm and 120-mm mortars, a T-84 tank, a recoiless gun, and a 155-mm howitzer landed there, fired from Klis, (?Kitornice), Boskovici, and Androvici. An antiaircraft machine gun, an antiaircraft gun, and sowers of death from Pecine kept Sapna, Kobilici, and Kraljevici under constant attack. Only small arms provocations by the aggressor were noted along other lines of the front," Banjalovic reports.

A report by the Press Center of the First Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army claims that "the fairly intense shelling of Hotonj, Vukusa, Ugorsko, and Barice lasted from early morning until the evening, with just brief interruptions. Fire from mortars, howitzers, recoiless guns, and other heavy artillery from Poljine, Blagovac, and Krivoglavci came down on fragile residential homes and helpless civilians." The press center then reports that "during the day the enemy also shelled positions No. 850 and 830, Foca Street, and the Transportation Faculty, while there was provocative fire along the dividing lines." The report adds that "luckily, there were no casualties."

Mustafa Kurtovic reports from Gorazde that "a veritable barrage of chetnik grenades from the direction of Ustipraca at Gajevi and (?Kopaci) has been under way since 0900." He adds that "aggressor scouts have been spotted in (?Dub)." "The shelling of the Ledine area from Kovaceva Ravan was ceaseless," Kurtovic says and reports that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army foiled an attempt to infiltrate a sabotage unit around Renovica; it was spotted in time and chased back to its positions.

Serb Leader Plavsic Comments on Ethnic Cleansing

AU0809112693 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 7 Sep 93 p 2

[Unattributed report: "I Would Rather We Cleansed Muslims From Eastern Bosnia"]

[Text] Professor Biljana Plavsic, member of the presidency of the republic of Srpska, told Novi Sad SVET:

"I would rather we cleansed the Muslims from eastern Bosnia. When I say cleansed, I do not want to be misinterpreted, so that you think I am talking about ethnic cleansing. They have misinterpreted a very natural occurrence, dubbing it as ethnic cleansing and qualifying it as a war crime. Even if we keep the 70 percent of the territory, there will be no peace there. There will be no peace for us. To put it this way, I wish them no good! But in order so that I can have peace, I have to give them something, somewhere where they can organize their lives for themselves, so that they do not keep pestering me all the time. That is how I see that 30 percent of the Muslim territory."

Croatian Leader Boban Meets With U.S. Ambassador

LD0709212893 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Report by Zdenko Vranjes from Grude]

[Excerpt] Mate Boban, the president of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, this afternoon received Victor Jackovich, the U.S. ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, who conveyed to him the U.S. Government's messages and informed of U.S. stands on the peace negotiations in Geneva. The U.S. Government's stand is that a peaceful settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina must be just and satisfactory for all three sides, and that they support the Croatian delegation's efforts at the Geneva negotiations to move toward this goal.

Humanitarian issues constituted an important topic of discussion. President Boban informed Ambassador Jackovich about the decisions of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna to release unilaterally more than 1,000 prisoners and to grant unconditional passage to all humanitarian convoys through the territory of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, an official statement from the meeting says.

Following the talks, Ambassador Jackovich said among other things that they had discussed Neum, but that the United States has no ready map which it wants to force upon the parties, or instructions to anyone as to what they should do. The U.S. Government expects maps, which will be just and satisfactory to all three sides, to be agreed upon, he said.

At a meeting today top officials of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna confirmed their commitment to make possible unhindered work and free movement of international humanitarian organizations in the territory of Herceg-Bosna. A statement from the meeting says that some prisoners have already been released and that maximum efforts are being invested to improve the living conditions of the prisoners of war in the territory of Herceg-Bosna, and that representatives of the International Red Cross and journalists have already been to the only two camps [in Herceg-Bosna]—Rodoc near Mostar and Dretelj near Capljina. [passage omitted]

Tudjman Discusses Bosnia, UNPROFOR

LD0609154293 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 6 Sep 93

[Monthly news conference given by President Franjo Tudjman in Zagreb, moderated by Vesna Skare-Ozbolt—live]

[Excerpts] [Ozbolt] Ladies and Gentlemen, I hereby open the regular press conference of the president of the republic, Dr Franjo Tudjman. You may proceed with your questions.

[Melinda] Melinda, Croatian Television. Please tell us this: How could it have happened that the Croats, who wished to sign the Geneva accord on Bosnia-Herzegovina unconditionally, are now being criticized by leading world statesmen? If I am not mistaken, Lord Owen declared only yesterday that the Croats are to blame for the disruption of the talks...

[Tudjman, interrupting] Where did Lord Owen say this?

[Melinda] I believe that even Croatian Television carried that statement. U.S. Secretary of State Christopher called on the Croats to be more flexible in their dealings with the Muslims. Thank you.

[Tudjman] I know nothing of Lord Owen's statement and it would be surprising if he had said such a thing because both cochairmen, Owen and Stoltenberg, wrote in their report to the UN secretary general that the Croatian side had accepted the package they proposed.

As far as Mr. Christopher's statement is concerned, it seems that it is rather difficult to comprehend from the U.S. point of view such a complex problem as that of interethnic relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is understandable that the United States is in favor of preserving Bosnia-Herzegovina. Likewise, we in Croatia—the Croatian Government, I myself—we were also in favor of preserving Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, we are setting off from the fact that we have experienced not only the collapse of communist socialism in Europe, but also the collapse of all multinational state communities on European soil. If Yugoslavia could not survive, not only because of its interethnic differences but also because the Croatian and Slovenian proposal on resolving the crisis on a confederal basis was not accepted, then this is evidently also the case with Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Therefore, if we are in favor of preserving Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state, then we should realize that it cannot be preserved as a unitary state, as a civil state—which is very close to the American standpoint, because the American nation, the American state was created on a multiethnic principle, on what is known as the melting pot of nations [phrase spoken in English] However, this is not possible in Europe and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For this reason, Mr. Christopher's interest in a single Bosnia-Herzegovina is understandable. However, on the basis of the overall European experience, as well as the experience of the former Yugoslavia and common sense, Bosnia-Herzegovina can only survive as a community of its three constituent nations. This realization has matured in the course of the activities of the European conference on the former Yugoslavia, from the time Cutilheiro [mediator of 1992 Bosnian talks in Lisbon] was proposing a cantonal system for Bosnia-Herzegovina to the present package, the draft resolution for ending the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of the founding of a state as a union of republics. I believe Mr. Christopher and the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be understood along these lines.

[Crnjakovic] Aleksa Crnjakovic, VJESNIK. Mr. President, you said on several occasions that the solving of the crisis in Croatia, that is, the problem of the occupied areas is closely linked to the solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. [The] Geneva [negotiations] have come to a halt for the time being and no agreement has been signed. Does that mean that we are further away from a solution to the problem in Croatia? Thank you.

[Tudjman] First of all, when speaking about [the] Geneva [negotiations] it should be understood that this is hopefully a temporary suspension. Considering the international circumstances in which we live, all factors involved in solving the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia—and now the most topical issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina—solving the [problem of the] UNPA in Croatia is naturally connected with the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The international factors have given priority to the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it is a generally accepted opinion that reaching an agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina would facilitate and create more favorable conditions for solving the [problem of the] UN protected zones in Croatia.

Considering all this, there is a link, and there will be a link. But as you know, the Croatian Government, we, have already asked the UN secretary general and the Security Council that UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Forces] mandate in Croatia be separated from UNPROFOR's mandate in the rest of the former Yugoslavia. This will be further discussed. In any case, our priority issue has been and remains the solving of the problem of the UN protected zones in Croatia.

[Modric] Sanja Modric, NOVI LIST and GLAS ISTRE. Mr. President, if the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna is recognized by the international community, how will Croatia guarantee the realization of the rights of the 600,000 Croats who have been living in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but outside the present boundaries of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, prior to the exodus?

[Tudjman] The ideal solution, of course, would be if all Croats could live in one state [laughs], in the case of both Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna. However, such a demand would be divorced from reality. Such a demand was unrealistic in the case

of the memorandum on policies of expansionism aimed at creating a greater Serbia and, needless to say, such a demand could not have been made by the Croats either. They could not have asked for more than to live in a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, but all they experienced was constant [territorial] suppression and demographic diminishment.

By way of illustration, according to the 1948 population census, Croats constituted 24 percent of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or, to be more precise, 23.9 percent. According to the latest census of 1991, they have been reduced to less than 18 percent. Therefore, the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina first had to put up with the hegemonistic rule of the Serbs and then of the Muslims. So any idea about the acceptance of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unitary state would threaten the survival of the Croatian nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself and, implicitly, the strategic interests of the Croatian state, in view of its geopolitical position and the outlines of its [state] border.

The policy which Croatia and the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina could realistically pursue—and here I must say that it is no secret that these Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina have collaborated with Croatia's state policies, that we have been aiding the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina to defend themselves first from Serb aggression and now from Muslim aggression—so the policy to pursue should be to preserve those regions with a majority Croatian population because this is an important prerequisite for the survival of the Croatian nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in these regions, while those Croats who remain in the other two republics, regardless of whether this is the Muslim or the Serb republic within the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina, must enjoy not only civil but also national rights on the basis of reciprocity. This reciprocity should be guaranteed by the constitutional solutions proposed for the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as by international conventions.

The creation of the Croat republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as is evident from what I have said, secures the strategic interests of the Croatian state and the Croatian nation as a whole.

[Badurina] Ingrid Badurina, LA STAMPA. According to [Lord] Owen and [Thorvald] Stoltenberg, the peace plan for Bosnia, envisioning the ethnic division of that country, is based on the realities in that country. Recently, several days ago, [Owen and Stoltenberg's deputy] Mr. [Geert] Ahrens said on his return from Knin that the Vance plan must be adjusted to accommodate the realities in Krajina. Mr. President, how do you interpret that statement?

[Tudjman] Your question contains a certain suspicion that the solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina could be applied to Croatia. Such suspicion, doubts, and even such speculations have no basis.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is inhabited by three constituent nations of equal sovereignty in that area. The only difference is that the Croatian nation has in a certain sense...[pauses] Regardless of the fact that it is fewer in number than the Serbs and Muslims, it lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina before the others. Therefore, they arrange their relations there on their own—unfortunately, not only through politics but also through war. The international community also arranges the relations between the three constituent nations.

At the same time, the problem of Serbs in Croatia is the problem of the Serb minority within the Croatian state. If someone says that the realities should be adjusted, he probably meant that in Croatia there are areas in which Serbs had a majority—which are the districts of Knin and Glina. But the Serbs in Croatia, and certainly the Croatian nation, will not forget that forcible changes occurred there. Despite the chetnik policy in the Knin area during the World War II and despite the authority the Serbs had in the Socialist Republic of Croatia until the establishing of the democratic authorities, nevertheless, almost half of Knin's population were Croats, and they have been driven out now.

UNPROFOR's task was to [make possible the] return of refugees and the task of the Croatian authorities has been and remains to integrate these areas into Croatia's constitutional and legal system. UN Security Council resolutions confirmed this on several occasions. We will therefore reintegrate these areas into Croatia's constitutional and legal system, enable the refugees to return there, and redress the injustices committed through crimes against the Croatian population in these areas.

[Ramljak] Olga Ramljak, SLOBODNA DALMACIJA. After the temporary interruption of the Geneva negotiations the story of Neum and the so-called ecological port was launched. According to newspaper reports, [Bosnian President] Alija Izetbegovic is in New York again and when the [Geneva] talks are continued he will insist on Muslim access to the [Adriatic] sea. He does not at all mention the free zone in the port of Ploce, but continues to insist on having Neum. What is the future of Neum? Is it going to be a part of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna or will it become a part of the Muslim republic, together with a corridor along the left bank of the River Neretva, as the opposition has been claiming?

My second question: The UNPROFOR mandate expires on 30 September. Croatia requested a separation of the mandate. The request was refused. What will happen if Croatia's requests regarding UNPROFOR are refused for the second time? Will the mandate still be extended? I would like to point out that in the south [of Croatia] Serb attacks are again under way, that there are fresh casualties and UNPROFOR is still not performing its function. Thank you.

[Tudjman] With regarding to Neum, according to the present borders [between the republics of the former Yugoslavia] Neum is a part of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the logic applied in seeking a solution for the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina Neum is a

constituent part of the Croat republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The representatives of the Croat side, that is, the representatives of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna did not agree to Izetbegovic's demand to include the Neum area into the Bosnian Muslim republic.

[The rejection was based on] principled reasons. First of all, if a solution is sought for the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a union of the republics and the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna is a part of the union, then [laughs] all members of the union of Herceg-Bosna [as heard] will have access to the sea.

Second, Neum is a solely Croatian territory, with purely Croatian population. Therefore, there is no reason for its inclusion in the Bosnian Muslim republic. Third, if Mr. Izetbegovic is constantly pressing for the preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a joint community, why is he then demanding Neum—apart from, as he said, psychological reasons?

Our part of the argument at the Geneva conference discussion was that the Croatian side cannot agree to the inclusion of the Neum area, a Croatian area, in the Muslim Bosnian republic both for strategic and political and even psychological reasons. For strategic reasons: because that would mean breaking the Croat republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina [as heard]—and not only that, but also breaking of the Croatian people and the Croatian state, that is, the Croatian republic [Republic of Croatia] into two parts. This is the part of the territory which, according to the Serb imperial policy—from the last century until today—they should occupy in order to conquer at least that southernmost area and, together with Dubrovnik, include it into Greater Serbia.

So, the objectives and intentions of greater Serb and Muslim politics go hand in hand in this respect. For strategic reasons it is unacceptable. For political reasons it is unacceptable for the Croatian side because the Croatian side was extremely cooperative and met the demands of the cochairmen and the international factors. As you know, it is not only the cochairmen—Lord Owen and Stoltenberg—who are taking part in conducting the conference and seeking a solution, but also representatives of the United States, earlier, the ambassador—I will not mention Mr. Vance now was the UN representative—but Ambassador Bartholomew was present earlier and now Redman, as well as the Russian deputy foreign minister [Churkin]. Europe, the United Nations, and the United States are present there. They are all taking part in resolving the crisis in a certain way, by putting pressure for an agreement to be reached.

In such circumstances the Croatian side, in order to meet the demands—if it is possible, bearing in mind Croatian strategic and political interest—has, for example, agreed to the inclusion of Stolac [southern Herzegovina], which had been defended by the Croat forces of Herceg-Bosna first from Serbian aggression and then from the Muslims, into the Muslim Bosnian republic. Since Stolac is mainly inhabited by the Muslim population, the Croatian side agreed to such a concession. The Croatian side gave up its demand for Fojnica, Kresevo, Kiseljak, Vares, and Zepce to be parts of the Croat republic—areas with predominantly Croatian population—because without them the Muslim Bosnian republic would not have a basis for survival, for life. In exchange, the Croat side got the areas of Kupres and Jajce, and, on the northern border [of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna] Novi Travnik, Vitez, and Busovaca.

So, for political reasons the Croatian side cannot agree to further concessions.

As far as psychological reasons go, since Mr. Izetbegovic mentioned them, the Croatian side can be even less inclined to accept the fragmentation of Croatian territories and the Croatian population, which applies not only to the territory of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna but also to the Croatian nation in general and to the Croatian state. The Croats cannot accept this because this Bosnian outlet to the sea is in fact a result of the Turkish wars of conquest in Europe in the period between 1699 and 1718, of the wars the Turks waged in Europe against the Venetians and others, when the diplomats of [the] Dubrovnik [Republic] managed to defend their state from the Venetians through the Sremski Karlovci peace treaty and the Pozarevac treaty [of 21 July, 1718], between 1699 and 1718, by which Dubrovnik ceded [these territories] to Turkey. Dubrovnik also had to pay taxes to Turkey, one of the conquering empires of the day, in order to be spared. Therefore, Dubrovnik's diplomats managed to defend their state from the Venetian menace by giving the then Turkish-ruled Bosnia an outlet to the sea at Neum, that is, Neum-Klek, but also at Sutorina. Concessions were later made to the Serbian side in socialist Yugoslavia, so this vestige of Turkey's policies of conquest on Croatian soil was left intact in the case of Neum-Klek, meaning that this outlet on Croatian territory, with a Croat population, was given to Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Sutorina, which used to be located in the triborder area between Croatia, Bosnia, and Montenegro was annexed to Montenegro so as not to represent a bone of contention.

Those who are aware of all this are extremely disgruntled with, and humiliated by, such a solution. In the present situation, when the Croats have a state of their own, they will not permit further humiliation and will not allow anybody to jeopardize their national and state survival in these regions.

So much for your first question. The second: UNPROFOR, as we know, is not meeting its obligations. UNPROFOR has fulfilled its first task—the departure of the Yugo-communist army from the territory of Croatia. But all the other responsibilities—the return of refugees and the gradual integration of the UN Protected Areas [UNPA] zones into the legal and constitutional system of Croatia—have not been met. Moreover, the occupation of one-quarter of Croatia's territory is being perpetuated under UNPROFOR's auspices, and instead of having

refugees return to their homes, we are witnessing fresh expulsions of, and atrocities against, the Croatian population.

These are the reasons why the Croatian Government has resolutely drawn the UN secretary general and Security Council's attention to the fact that it is no longer willing to extend UNPROFOR's mandate, in view of its present authorizations, but will demand that this mandate be altered and that the Vance plan, that is, all the Security Council resolutions, finally be implemented. This, in our opinion, particularly applies to resolution 769, which envisions that UNPROFOR should secure the borders betwen Croatia and Serbia and Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina—which it failed to do, and this is one of the reasons Serb aggression against Croatia is continuing.

This is apparent in the continuous inflow of arms and military units from Serbia, even under the guise of volunteers, into Knin and the other UNPA zones. Some of these people also come from Bosnia.

Second, we attach special importance to the implementation of resolutions 815 and 847, which prescribe that these [UNPA] zones are a constituent part of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia. At our explicit request, resolution 847 says that the integration into our legal and constitutional system should be a gradual process, that road and rail links should be reestablished with Croatia, as well as power lines and oil pipelines. Therefore, UNPROFOR will have to have its mandate expanded—not merely in the sense of supervising the implementation of these resolutions, which was obstructed by the Serb rebels in the past with the direct connivance of, and encouragement from, Belgrade and Serbia—but UNPROFOR will have to receive additional authorizations and reinforcements to carry this out by force if not otherwise.

This is yet to be discussed and the Croatian Government will certainly pay attention to overall international relations in these negotiations, but it will not back off from its demands.

[Correspondent, name indistinct, question in English with simultaneous translation] from the Netherlands. After the collapse of the peace talks in Geneva, accusations were made by Cedric Thornberry regarding the Croatian Army's presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Could you exclude the possibility, openly and fairly, that the Republic of Croatia and the republic of Herceg-Bosna will unite? Is Croatia helping the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina militarily, as Mr. Thornberry suggested, or in some other ways?

[Tudjman] I do not know exactly what Mr. Thornberry said, but accusations about the presence of the Croatian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been reiterated. The Croatian Army is present in Bosnia-Herzegovina only in the area between Dubrovnik and Stolac because this is necessary for the defense of Croatian territory and it is in accordance with the agreement of 12 July last year which President Izetbegovic and myself signed.

There are no Croatian Army units anywhere else in Bosnia-Herzegovina but there are volunteers from Croatia, including people born in Bosnia-Herzegovina or people who come from Bosnia-Herzegovina and who took part in the defense war in Croatia and then asked to be discharged from the Croatian Army and left for Bosnia-Herzegovina as volunteers, to fight first against the Serbian aggression and now against the Muslim. This is the truth regarding the presence of the Croatian Army and the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As for the question regarding the possible unification: Croatia was and remains in favor of a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, but only in a form which is possible, that is, as I said, a union of three constituent parts, which was agreed in the form of a union of the three republics at the [Geneva] conference. There is, therefore, no reason to talk about any unification [of Croatia and Herceg-Bosna]. The Croatian interest in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatian state interest are protected in this way. Furthermore, we think that preservation of such a union, with justly drawn borders and relations organized in accordance with the proposed constitutional principles, would be in the interest of the Croatian state and the Croatian people as a whole.

However, it is worrying that Mr. Izetbegovic, on behalf of a part of the Muslim leadership—I say a part because it is well known that there is no agreement even among all Muslim members of his presidency... [pauses] Mr. Fikret Abdic from Bihac province, the presidency member who won the most votes in the election [in Bosnia in 1990] was in favor of the solution proposed by the cochairmen. The Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina cooperate with a number of prominent Muslims. I do not know them all, but I remember the names of those who have visited Zagreb with the Croatian representatives: Mr. Hadziosmanovic, chairman of Izetbegovic's party in Mostar, an engineer by profession, a very sensible man; Mr. Armin Pohara, Sabanovic, and a number of other prominent Muslims.

Izetbegovic's refusal on behalf of a part of the Muslim leadership—and it seems the very part that advocated the idea that Bosnia-Herzegovina should stay within Yugoslavia, or which claimed that the Muslims are Serbs by origin and closer to the Serbs—to accept the agreement and his announcement that he will return to the Geneva conference only at the end of this month ring ominously. They are immediately followed by a Muslim offensive against the HVO and the Croat people in all areas of central Bosnia, even in the areas envisioned to be parts of the Croat republic.

As you already know, over the past several days there have been around 20 Croatian casualties in Mostar, including children, five of them were killed and the rest were injured. The Muslim offensive is in progress in the areas between Novi Travnik, Vitez and Busovaca, Zepce, Vares, and also in the areas of Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf.

Therefore, it seems that Mr. Izetbegovic, by saying that he would return to the Geneva conference by the end of the month, wishes his military forces to seize until that time territory that the Croats have liberated and where they are defending their own existence in areas such as Vares, Zepce, Usora, Kiseljak which have been envisioned to remain within the Bosnian Muslim republic and in those which have been envisioned to belong to the Croat republic. This is not in the interest of the Croatian people nor is it in the interest of the Muslims. For their part, the Croats in Herceg-Bosna, Croatia, and I personally shall invest further efforts in direct negotiations with Mr. Izetbegovic and other Muslim representatives aimed at preventing the flare-up of further conflicts and at trying to create the conditions for cooperation between the two republics within the union, because that would be in the interests of both Croat and Muslim nations. Of course, goodwill displayed by only one side is not sufficient for an agreement.

[Biskolj] Mate Biskolj from VECERNJI LIST. Mr. President, only two brief questions. First, what is your comment on the latest event that took place in Pakrac where the English, when rebuilding our school building, demanded that the Croatian banner be taken down. And the second, can you give more details on what you talked about with the opposition leaders when they met with you (?last) week? Thank you.

[Tudjman] [passage omitted] What did I talk about with the leaders of the parliamentary parties? More or less what I talk about with you at news conferences. The meeting took place immediately after the suspension of the Geneva negotiations. I therefore informed the leaders of the parliamentary parties taking part in the Assembly's work about the course of the talks, Croatia's state policy, the other sides' stands, and about how to protect the strategic long-term interests of the Croatian state and the Croatian nation as a whole, including of course [the Croatian nation] in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

[Correspondent, name indistinct] Weekly DANAS. Mr. President, we have just spoken about President Izetbegovic's visit to the United States. Could you comment on Mr. Christopher's statement that greater flexibility is demanded of Croatia? What guarantees could Alija Izetbegovic obtain from America? We can see in the fact that the U.S. media report very briefly, almost not at all, on the suffering of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina that a certain atmposphere of pressure on Croatia is being created. Is that correct?

And, one question referring to home affairs. I would like to know if the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] Presidium was [in session] and if it discussed among other things the Argus affair. Branimir Glavas said in an interview to VECERNJI LIST that everyone will have to choose between Stipe Mesic and Vladimir Seks. Could you say something more about it? Thank you very much.

[Tudjman] As I have already said: All participants—from Europe to the United States, from the EC to the United Nations—exert pressure on all sides in conflict or interested in solving the crisis in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Therefore, the pressure is not exerted only on Croatia, but, I repeat, on all sides.

Speaking about this we must be honest and tell our public that the international community—again, from the EC to the United Nations, from certain European states to the United States of America—did not know how to solve the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and has not taken any concrete steps in order to stop the Serbian aggression. And in their own way they are now turning a blind eye to the Muslim aggression against the Croatian nation. By passing the blame to both the Croatian nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to Croatia, they are in their own way looking for a pretext as to why they have not done anything against the Serb aggression, and why they are now speaking only about the Muslims being victims and cannot see that the Croats in all parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina are threatened—except in the parts which they firmly hold.

What can be expected? I think that in addition to these political pressures Mr. Izetbegovic cannot expect anything else, and that his tactic of refusal has in fact been obvious during all the time of the clashes.

First his Muslim leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not prepare for defense against the Yugo-communist and Serbian aggression. You all remember very well that during the war in Croatia they said it was not their war. In the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, there was talk of Bosnia-Herzegovina advocating the policy that it was good for Slovenia to leave when it wanted to and when Serbs allowed it to, that Croatia should be given some more confederal rights and that Bosnia-Herzegovina should rely more on Serbia. Then there was—in the beginning of the conflict in Bosnia—the historic agreement between Muslims and Serbs, and also in the framework of these negotiations which the Serbs—within the scope of realizing their greater Serbian plan—did not accept. [sentence as heard]

Izetbegovic, faced with such an aggression, first relied on the possibility of extensive military assistance from Islamic countries. That failed to materialize except in the form of mujahed volunteers, and of course financial assistance. Mr. Izetbegovic then believed that there would be military intervention. When this failed to materialize as well, he expected air strikes. Now he is expecting that the verbal support which he has been given—and that support is largely a pretext on the part of the international community which did not find, or for various reasons and mutual differences, did not want to find a way to stop the Serbian aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina—that he will be granted concessions for which in principle he has a moral right if he demands that all areas in eastern Bosnia in which Muslims used to live and from which they have been driven out be allocated to the Muslim republic.

But this raises the question of why the international community allowed this aggression and who will, and with which forces, force the Serbs to give up these areas. To tell the truth, we should admit that the international community's political moves and sanctions imposed against Serbia have placed Serbia in international political and economic isolation. Serbia is experiencing difficult times under the sanctions. This is why during the negotiations it was forced to give up about 20 percent—15 to 20 percent—of the territory captured by Serb forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But the international community is still encouraging all three sides to reach an agreement, a solution acceptable to all three sides by consensus.

Therefore, on the one hand, Mr. Izetbegovic is deceiving himself by thinking that he will obtain the borders he wants with the help of an international power. I also think that the solution being offered—despite all the good reasons he has to be dissatisfied with it—is much more favorable than could have been supposed. The division—although the currently offered map [gives Muslims] about 31 percent—also gives them about 54 percent of the total industrial, scientific, and technological potential of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, as I said in the answer to the first question, Mr. Izetbegovic is unfortunately expecting the Muslim forces possibly to be able to conquer Croat areas. The Muslim forces have not engaged in fighting against areas held by the Serbs. All offensives are launched against Croatian areas in central Bosnia.

This is a policy of unrealistic expectations and, I would say, an irrational policy which cannot bring much good to the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina unless reason prevails at the last moment and the solutions, which the relatively objective international factors believe to be realistic, are accepted.

[Correspondent, name indistinct] And the other question on the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ]?

[Tudjman] Well, I believe you have read the statement. The statement was sufficiently brief, but clear and succinct. It condemned public polemics, and all those conducting them, on issues which should be discussed normally in the framework of specific state bodies but, above all, within party bodies. This practice will not be permitted any more. It is important to resolve these personal and political disagreements in this brief period up to the second general convention of the HDZ in the middle of next month. [passage omitted]

[Todorovski] Ilinka Todorovski, Radio-Television Slovenia. Mr. Tudjman, could you please explain what the current negotiating status of Mr. Izetbegovic is? Does he still represent the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina or does he only represent the Muslim side and is he thus negotiating at the level of Mr. Boban and Mr. Karadzic? Thank you.

[Tudjman] Objectively and in reality, he represents the leadership of the Muslim leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina and, as I have said, a disunited leadership. Even members whom he is supposed to be leading at the negotiating table... [pauses] Here where you are sitting, one of the members of the delegation that he brought along to a meeting said: Izetbegovic does not represent me or all Muslims.

This is clear to all international factors. However, in view of the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a member of the United Nations and that Mr. Izetbegovic has remained at the head of a Bosnian Presidency that no longer exists in reality as a real Bosnian Presidency—because it no longer includes any Croatian representatives—and in view of the fact that this Muslim leadership began the aggression against the Croatian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and calls the two Serb representatives in it private representatives or nonrepresentatives of those Serbs with whom it has dealings, Izetbegovic also has dealings with the international community. [sentence as heard]

Nevertheless, given this situation, the international community is negotiating with President Izetbegovic because it is important for someone—both from the former Presidency and from the Muslim leadership—to sign the proposed solution. After all, if this were signed only by those, as I said, who are from the ranks of the Muslims, whom I mentioned, who support an agreement, then Mr. Izetbegovic and his colleagues could reject it. So, yes, formally he is in this post, regardless of the fact that his regular mandate has expired. He managed to prolong it in this war situation, although the validity of this extension is open to debate.

So the situation, as in all war circumstances, is as it is and it will be like this—a temporary one—until peace is achieved. Peace is really necessary both for the peoples who live in Bosnia-Herzegovina and for all of Croatia's neighbors, and for it to be possible to resolve the issue of the UN Protected Areas. But it is also needed by the international community in a general sense.

Gentlemen, not only the cochairmen but all other participants—and I have said who they are—have assured us that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the sanctions that are being leveled have adversely affected all neighboring states—Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovenia, and also European and world peace in view of the possible complications. So it is to be expected that this is, under these circumstances, only a temporary interruption in the negotiations in Geneva and that they will resume and that ultimately there will be an end to this war and this uncertainty and a solution will be reached, probably, in fact, in the framework of what has already been proposed, with bigger or smaller alterations. We shall see. Thank you.

Muslims Release Statement on 'Organized Persecution'

LD0709141893 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1147 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Excerpt] Zagreb, 7 Sep (TANJUG)—Following yesterday's bomb explosion in a Zagreb shop belonging Salim Sabic, the chairman of the assembly of the Islamic

community in Croatia and Slovenia, religious, cultural, national and other organizations of the Muslims in Croatia issued a public statement condemning this terrorist act.

The statement reads that the act is "the expected result of the organized persecution of Muslims in the Republic of Croatia."

"As a result of the conflict and military clashes between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, members of the Islamic community and of the Muslim nation residing in Croatia who are loyal citizens of the Croatian state are becoming free targets on whom fury is being vented. In terms of its proportions, and numerically speaking, it exceeds any events over the past 50 years," the statement says.

"The unconstitutional negation of the ethnic and national existence of Muslims" in the print media, and also by "influential individuals at the very head of the state" illustrates this, it alleges further. The public media is "full of articles containing incredible hatred of Islam and Muslim believers, something which was considered punishable in all previous regimes." [passage omitted]

Bosnian Serb Commander Mladic Visits Krajina

LD0609200093 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1909 GMT 6 Sep 93

[Text] Knin, Serb Krajina, Sept 6 (TANJUG)—Peace will soon return to all Serb-populated lands in former Yugoslavia, shattered by war, because the big powers have realised that their policy in the Balkans has been wrong, says Bosnian Serb Army Commander General Ratko Mladic. General Mladic said that the overall military situation in the Balkans had changed and that the world powers had realized the error of their policy of summarily erasing borders and a whole nation.

In 1991 and 1992, the European Community spearheaded the premature international recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as independent states after their violent secession from fomer Yugoslavia, ignoring the Serbs' opposition to the decisions to secede, taken by the regimes in Zagreb (Croatia) and Sarajevo (Bosnia).

General Mladic said that conditions were ripe on the international scene for the Serb people to be recognised by the international community, because the world had realised that the Serbs, just like the other nations, have the right to self-determination and freedom.

General Mladic was visiting Knin, in the republic of Serb Krajina (R.S.K.), where he discussed with local officials the promotion of economic relations and development of the Bosnian Serb republic and the R.S.K. The Bosnian Serb republic and the R.S.K. have been declared by the local Serbs after the secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, respectively, from the former Yugoslav Federation. The talks were attended by R.S.K. Army Commander General Mile Novakovic.

Hadzic Rejects 'Any Coexistence' With Croats

AU0809114993 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 7 Sep 93 p 2

[Report by B. G.: "We Do Not Accept Confederation"]

[Text] Erdut—The republic of Serbian Krajina is a reality that is accepted by the world, and therefore has to be accepted by Croatia. This is what Goran Hadzic, president of the republic of Serbian Krajina, told BORBA yesterday.

"For example, even though it is too late now, the world is imposing a change in the constitution on the Croats, to make the Serbs in Croatia a constituent nation. The Croats are very afraid of this as it would lead to a confederal organization of the former Socialist Republic of Croatia. Croats need not fear since we do not agree to any coexistence with them," Hadzic says, and adds: "The world is changing its attitude toward us. The best example of that is the fact that the Kresevo border crossing will soon be open, since the Hungarian side now agrees that a UN flag can fly on our side, while, before, they insisted on the Croatian flag as it was Croatia. We are ready to discuss all the problems with the Croats, so that we can live as good neighbors. However, we will only talk as equal sides—Tudjman on one side of the table and I on the other, and the same goes for the prime ministers, and so on," Hadzic said.

Federal

Belgrade Daily Says Government To Resign 22 Sep

LD0809101993 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0945 GMT 8 Sep 93

[Text] Belgrade, Sept 8 (TANJUG)—In its Wednesday morning issue, the Belgrade daily POLITIKA EKSPRES cites reliable sources as having said that the Federal Government headed by Prime Minister Radoje Kontic is to resign on the next joint session of the Yugoslav Assembly's two chambers scheduled for September 22.

The daily does not specify reasons for such an act, but writes that this would be a 'voluntary' ceding of authority.

Citing the same sources, the daily writes that, according to a proposal from Montenegro (the federal unit which, together with Serbia, makes up the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), the new prime minister would be from Serbia.

Under the Yugoslav constitution, however, president of the republic and prime minister as a rule cannot come from the same federal unit. The current president of Yugoslavia is from Serbia and the prime minister is from Montenegro.

Asked about the issue, Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic has told the Belgrade daily POLITIKA he knows nothing about resignation of the government.

Council of Albanian Parties Holds Meeting

AU0809110393 Tirana ATA in English 0855 GMT 8 Sep 93

[Text] Pristine, September 8 (ATA)—The meeting of the Coordinating Council of Albanian Political Parties in Former Yugoslavia held in Pristina was attended by representatives of political parties of Kosova, Macedonia, Montenegro and southern Serbia. The meeting was presided over by the president of Kosova and chairman of the council, Dr. Rugova, and focused on the current political situation in the Albanian territories. It also drew some political conclusions. President Rugova presented an overview of the general political situation in Kosova and other Albanian territories in former Yugoslavia. The political situation has become very grave due to stable and growing pressure, Rugova said. So far the coordinating council has aimed more at developing mutual cooperation among parties included in the council.

The first option of the political statement approved by the Council in October 1991 defines that the Albanian political parties favoured the independent and sovereign Kosova and the Albanians of Macedonia as a state-forming people and to the Albanians in Montenegro and south Serbia the option granted autonomy. The participants promised a better organization of Albanian political parties of diaspora and devoted special importance to the all-sided cooperation with political parties in Albania. The meeting also stressed that special attention should be devoted to the presentation of the issue of Kosova and the Albanians in former Yugoslavia at the international forums and institutions as it has been done so far.

Official Reports Tuberculosis Epidemic

LD0709160193 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1423 GMT 7 Sep 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] Novi Sad, Sept 7 (TANJUG)—An epidemic of tuberculosis in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) is taking on tragic proportions, director of the lung diseases and tuberculosis institute in Sremska Kamenica in the Serbian province of Vojvodina Dr Tamara Zikic said on Tuesday [7 September].

In an alarming appeal to the Paris-based International Union against Tuberculosis and Lung Diseases (IUAT), Dr Zikic pointed out that the economic sanctions introduced by the U.N. Security Council against Yugoslavia late in May last year have induced shortages of all necessary medicaments.

She appealed to the IUAT to demand the lifting of some of the economic sanctions against Yugoslavia, notably the ban on imports of medicine.

If this is not achieved, disastrous consequences might ensue to be felt for decades, and Yugoslavia might become a dangerous hotbed of tuberculosis, the disease that could then spread to cover also other parts of Europe, Dr Zikic warned.

The epidemic of tuberculosis in Yugoslavia has been caused primarily by the immigration of population from the regions where a great 'storage' of infection existed even before, and also by an increasingly difficult economic situation which prevents timely detection and treatment of patients.

One out of every three patients on treatment in the Sremska Kamenica Institute in 1993 are tuberculosis cases. In previous years, they accounted for only 9 percent of the total number of the institute patients, Dr Zikic said.

What is most alarming is that these are young people of an average age of 39, Dr Zikic warned.

She asked IUAT to send to Yugoslavia a team of experts to see for themselves the size of the problem, and, cooperating with the institute experts, to work out a programme to suppress the disease.

In the first half of 1993, 108 Yugoslavs died of contagious diseases due to shortages of vaccines and medicaments. This was 5.4 times the rate registered in the year-earlier period.

Most of them died of the illnesses which did not result in any deaths last year—acute enterocolitis and measles.

Since the introduction of the sanctions, mortality in Yugoslavia has risen on average even up to 30 percent for some groups of patients.

Serbia

Serbian, Macedonian Delegations Discuss Sanctions

LD0709204993 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1742 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Text] Belgrade, Sept 7 (TANJUG)—The delegations of Serbia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia met late on Monday [6 September] in Skopje to discuss the two republic's relations in conditions of international sanctions, the Serbian Information Ministry said in a statement on Tuesday.

The delegations, which met when the Serbian Government delegation made a stopover upon its return from Greece, were headed by the Serbian and Macedonian prime ministers, Nikola Sainovic and Branko Crvenkovski.

The statement said that the delegations discussed in detail the current political situation in the Balkans and bilateral relations under the U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia.

Last weekend the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia decided to strictly apply U.N. Security Council resolution 820 on tightening the sanctions against Yugoslavia and completely halted all cargo traffic on all border crossings with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Macedonian authorities claim they will allow passage only to vehicles carrying permits by the U.N. Sanctions Committee.

Yugoslav customs and border organs report that no trucks have crossed the Yugoslav-Macedonian border since September 4, but that passenger traffic is conducted without any difficulty.

Macedonia

Report Considers Possibility of U.S. Diplomatic Mission

AU0709151293 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 3 Sep 93 p 2

[N.R. report: "Americans Interested in Well-Functioning Cooperation"]

[Text] Following the news that in the next few days the United States will allegedly announce its decision to open a diplomatic mission in Macedonia, we asked several places for confirmation or denial.

The representative of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade responsible for Macedonia, Mr. Robert Norman, who has been working in Skopje for some time now, told us to approach Belgrade or Washington for official comment. However, he pointed out, as he said, "the increased permanent presence of U.S. senators and congressmen in Macedonia in the last 10 days." He recalled the separate visits of Congressman John Reed, Congressman Newt Gingrich, and General Boyd, Senators Richard Lugar and Paul Coverdell [names and titles as published], and the visit of a congress delegation headed by Congressman Skelton two days ago, together with Rudy Perina, charge d'affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade. "Their visits were, first of all, connected with the deployment of U.S. troops here," Norman said. "I have been working in diplomacy for more than 13 years and I have never seen such a large number of high U.S. officials in one place in such a short period of time. I think it is a clear indication that the U.S. Congress has an interest in this region." He also added that the discussions with President Kiro Gligorov and Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski with these U.S. high officials focused on the Macedonian-Greek dispute about the name, the threats to stability in Macedonia, and what the United States can or cannot do to maintain this stability.

Asked to explain the U.S. attitude regarding the recognition of Macedonia, Mr. Robert Norman said that only the White House is competent to answer this question and that there are several aspects that need real clarification. As he said, "he would not like to take the risk of not explaining them all in detail."

"In my opinion," Norman said, "the main point is that the United States is interested in establishing well-functioning cooperation with Macedonia, and my presence here, and the presence of the U.S. troops, clearly reflects that interest—despite the fact that recognition, at this moment, may come later."

At the same time, even the Belgrade Embassy could not give us official confirmation about the possible opening of a U.S. diplomatic mission in Skopje, while Undersecretary Viktor Gaber of the Foreign Ministry had no comment at this stage, in the expectation of a possible official announcement.

No Serbian Trucks Noted Since U.S. Deployment

AU0809101193 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 7 Sep 93

[Unattributed report: "Macedonian-Greek Border Without Serbian Trucks"]

[Text] A growing number of Greek trucks carrying flour, sugar and cooking oil, intended for the Macedonian companies, are crossing the Macedonia-Greek border following the reduction of the customs duties for these articles.

The Serbian trucks have not been seen at the border crossing Bogorodica-Evzoni since the U.S. battalion increased the control of the sanctions toward Yugoslavia, on the northern Macedonian border.

These past few days, Macedonian trucks have been entering Greece without any greater problems. The Greek border officials are still sending back passenger vehicles with documents issued in Macedonia.

Official Says Border Procedures Unchanged

AU0809101593 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 7 Sep 93

[Unattributed report: "Sanctions Are Strictly Implemented"]

[Text] The Macedonian Deputy Foreign Minister and chief of the section for economic relations Dimitar Belcev stated for MILS yesterday that the border regime toward FRY has not been changed, but it was a matter of strict implementation of the resolution 820. He explained that the border crossings were now normally equipped with people and can therefore carry out their duties much more diligently.

The director of the Macedonian customs management Dimitar Buzlevski said that the border officials have strict orders to close the ramp to any cargo without a permit from the representatives of the UN Sanctions Committee.

Cross-border Freight Traffic With FRY At A Standstill

LD0709172493 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1353 GMT 7 Sep 93

[Excerpt] Presevo, 7 Sep (TANJUG)—Vlastimir Potic, head of the Nis customs office, told TANJUG's reporter today that since Friday 3 September not a single truck has crossed the border at the Presevo border crossing either from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or from the opposite direction.

The Macedonian authorities claim that this is not an example of stepping up the sanctions against the FRY, but only the strict implementation of the UN resolution, and that only freight vehicles with valid permission from the UN Committee for Sanctions can cross the border. [passage omitted]

Kosovo

Officials Prevent Delegation From Attending Talks

AU0809110993 Tirana ATA in English 1017 GMT 8 Sep 93

[Text] Pristine, September 8 (ATA)—On September 6, the Serbian border officials prevented the Kosova delegation from attending the Geneva Talks of the Special Group of Kosova in the context of the International Conference for Former Yugoslavia on the issues of the Albanian education. The delegation of Kosova was made up of Dr. Fehmi Agani, Dr. Hivzi Islami, Rexhep Osmani, Dr. Xhavit Ahmeti and Halim Hyseni. The police got hold of their passports and the materials of the conference. The delegation could not catch the plane flying from Skopje to Geneva since its members stayed for a long time in the border. According to reports the delegation will travel on September 7 afternoon and negotiations have been put off for September 8. The Serbian delegation has refused to take part in the talks, informal reports say.

The statements issued by the presidency of the Democratic League of Kosova protests against the mistreatment of the delegation. The statement also believes that the officials of the Geneva Conference will adopt the correct stand and will take action to ensure the normal work of the proceedings of the conference.

The wise policy pursued by the Albanians of Kosova has been appreciated by the international democratic forces who have presented the Kosova issue in Geneva Conference through its special group and approved two resolutions for Kosova at the UN and helped the democratic forces in Albania too.